The first successful U.S. satellite, Explorer 1, was launched on January 31, 1958, from Cape Canaveral, Florida. It was rapidly constructed in response to the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik 1 the previous year. Credit: NASA
The rise of open-source technologies has significantly reshaped the risks and opportunities of the traditional intelligence landscape. What roles should government and commercial entities play in guiding future developments, and how can each wield their responsibility and influence to protect national security interests?
In the early morning of January 8, 2020, Iran launched a barrage of ballistic missiles against two military bases in Iraq that housed many of the more than five thousand American service members. Iran carried out the attack in retaliation for an American drone strike five days earlier that killed General Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force.1
More than one hundred U.S. service members suffered traumatic brain injuries. The Iranian attack, however, killed no American troops due, in part, to U.S. commanders evacuating thousands of troops and dozens of aircraft shortly before Iranian missiles struck the bases.2 Iran’s government described its strike as a “precise and targeted” act of self-defense, while U.S. officials highlighted the lack of American loss of life.3
Commercial information technologies—namely privately-operated imagery satellites—played a critical role in informing both Iran’s precision targeting and U.S. evacuation efforts. General Frank McKenzie, then-commander of U.S. Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East, explained that his staff was aware Iran had been purchasing daily commercial satellite images of the air base. He used this information to time the evacuation, waiting until the Iranians had downloaded their last image of the day—when everything at the base would appear as business as usual—before ordering the dispersal of American assets and personnel. “There’s a bit of an art there, how you do it,” McKenzie said. “If you move too early, then they refresh and they adjust their plans.”4
The episode underscores the increasingly consequential role of commercial information technologies and firms in shaping international security outcomes. The growing availability of commercial satellites and other technologies that gather information about military and government activity has eroded the near-monopolies governments traditionally enjoyed over the collection and dissemination of sensitive national security information.5 Data from commercial satellites, smart devices, cell phones, and a range of other technologies now produce massive amounts of information that can be rapidly disseminated to global audiences.
This increased transparency brought about by commercial technologies has been both a bane and boon to governments. On the one hand, this new transparency presents new problems for governments. Technology that reveals sensitive information about military operations or nuclear arsenals that were once largely hidden from public view, for instance, allows rivals to threaten or target a government’s personnel. On the other hand, transparency provides states with information that can be used to preempt or deter rival activity and to share information with allies and the public without jeopardizing sensitive intelligence sources.
This newfound transparency poses vexing challenges for both governments and commercial actors as they adapt to a world with fewer national security secrets.6 In some instances, governments have welcomed the commercial technology sector, relaxing regulations governing certain types of information collection and contracting with private firms to make use of their resources.7 Military and intelligence officials have even assisted non-government actors in using open-source platforms to analyze rival states.8 In other cases, however, increased transparency has forced governments to adapt their behavior.
Firms that enable or provide open-source intelligence can provide an independent check that holds governments accountable, uncovering atrocities that might otherwise go undocumented or revealing information that contradicts a leader’s claims. Yet, by taking on these new roles, commercial firms may increasingly find themselves, both figuratively and literally, in the crosshairs of hostile adversaries.
Cooperate, Condone, or Condemn?
As commercial technologies chip away at states’ near-monopolies on sensitive information, governments must learn how to navigate the changing information domain. In some cases, states have embraced the transparency brought about by open-source technologies. States cooperate with commercial and non-government information providers for several reasons.
First, commercial information technologies can allow governments to purchase capabilities that either substitute for or augment state capabilities. This is reportedly what Iran did when planning its attack on Al Asad Air Base. Although U.S. officials declined to identify the source of these commercial images, they acknowledged that “Iran uses commercial satellite imagery from a variety of sources.”9
Even states that possess their own advanced intelligence-gathering capabilities can leverage commercial satellite imagery and other open-source platforms to supplement their own collection activities. Commercially-operated platforms help provide redundancy to government-operated systems and provide additional capacity to fill collection gaps. Indeed, the U.S. government is looking to leverage commercial satellites to enhance the resiliency of its satellite operations.10
Second, information acquired using open-source technologies can allow states to disclose information that governments want released without jeopardizing sensitive intelligence sources and methods. This can facilitate intelligence sharing among allies and partners. In some cases, this is intended to increase the effectiveness of military operations. To this end, commercial satellite imagery has been routinely listed alongside traditional military hardware in the security assistance packages the United States has delivered to Ukraine, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency accelerated its plans to procure commercial imagery in the immediate aftermath of the Russian invasion.11
Commercially-acquired information also allows governments to reveal information to the public and foreign governments in ways that generate strategic effects. For example, commercial satellite imagery played a significant role in helping convince skeptical allies of the seriousness of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intentions to invade Ukraine, helping counter Moscow’s disinformation campaign and deny its forces the element of surprise as Russian troop mobilizations took place in open view of privately owned platforms.
Soon after Russia’s invasion, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg pointed to commercial satellite imagery as confirming the intelligence being shared among NATO countries.12 According to Dr. Stacey Dixon, principal deputy director of national intelligence, collaboration between the intelligence community and the private sector “allowed others to independently interpret the images, piecing them together with other information, and tell the world what was about to happen.”13
Third, the availability of publicly releasable information can help government agencies to advance their institutional assessments and preferences. In August 2021, for example, General C.Q. Brown, Jr., then the Air Force Chief of Staff, applauded the disclosure of the construction of more than one hundred missile silos in western China, which had been discovered earlier that summer by independent researchers at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists using commercial satellite imagery.14 General Brown commented, “It’s kind of good that it’s out there so folks see the pace of change of our adversary.”15
Similarly, Admiral Charles Richard, then-commander of U.S. Strategic Command, which oversees the United States nuclear arsenal, was even more blunt in embracing open-source disclosures. “If you enjoy looking at commercial satellite imagery or stuff in China, can I suggest you keep looking?”16 By drawing attention to threats, leaders may be able to secure political support for their organizations.
Transparency, however, is a double-edged sword: the same technologies that deliver dividends to governments can also erode their capacity to secure their own secrets. Although governments sometimes welcome increased information availability, information from commercial and open-source technologies can also undermine government efforts to frame developments favorably or keep operations secret.
In 2018, analysts used commercial satellite imagery to contradict President Donald Trump’s claims that North Korea no longer posed a nuclear threat following his summit with Kim Jong-un.17 Pulitzer Prize-winning reporting from BuzzFeed News used commercial satellite imagery to expose the scope and scale of China’s mass detention of Uighurs and other religious and ethnic minorities in its western provinces.18 And media organizations have published data from smart devices and commercial satellite imagery to reveal sensitive military operations, including previously undisclosed U.S. bases in Africa and extensive Israeli defense cooperation with Arab countries in countering Iranian threats.19
Soldiers, Statesmen, and CEOs
The increasing importance of open-source intelligence yields new roles for commercial and non-government actors that collect, analyze, and disseminate this information. Of course, the ability of private actors to influence security outcomes and shape warfighting environments is hardly a new phenomenon. Private firms have played important roles in financing, feeding, transporting, and equipping militaries and mercenaries for centuries. Mercantile companies like the English East India Company and Dutch East India Company assumed quasi-sovereign status, collecting intelligence and waging war.20
What distinguishes private actors contributing to the ongoing open-source revolution from past commercial actors in the international security domain is the speed at which the former can generate dramatic political and military consequences. Private actors, for instance, can analyze and globally disseminate a satellite image just moments after the image is collected. Moreover, commercial information-gathering technologies are empowering a range of actors from individual sleuths to larger open-source analytic organizations like Bellingcat.21 This has introduced countless non-government actors into territory that was once largely the purview only of states with robust intelligence institutions.
Growing reliance on commercial information technologies can empower corporate actors, often giving them significant influence in international affairs. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl experienced the sway of commercial firms in October 2022, when he found himself on the phone with Elon Musk, who was threatening to cut off Starlink internet services that Ukrainian forces were using for targeting and communication. “Even though Musk is not technically a diplomat or a statesman,” Kahl explained, “I felt it was important to treat him as such, given the influence he had on the issue.”22
Commercial information firms gain influence not only among government actors, but also among the public. The perceived political independence of these firms from government actors could give them greater sway in influencing domestic or international opinion. Indeed, recent academic studies find that open-source information from non-government actors that contradicts a leader’s claims can degrade public support for the leader and their foreign policy.23 Of course, the public might also have reasons to doubt the claims of non-government entities. This may be particularly likely if the public believes that the commercial actor’s profit motives color assessments or information.
While technology use can empower commercial actors, it also creates new vulnerabilities for firms and the governments they work with. As open-source information becomes more consequential, rivals have greater incentives to limit the information’s impact. In some cases, rivals might attempt to muddy the information environment or discredit commercial firms with misinformation, perhaps by releasing conflicting or inaccurate information.
This flawed information could include misleading analysis or even fake imagery produced using generative artificial intelligence. Rivals might also try to limit a firm’s operations by conducting cyber or kinetic attacks against commercial networks or infrastructure. Indeed, in the fall of 2022, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry official issued a veiled threat against commercial satellites. He noted that, “an extremely dangerous trend that goes beyond the harmless use of outer space technologies has become apparent during the latest developments in Ukraine. Namely, the use by the United States and its allies of civilian, including commercial, infrastructure in outer space for military purposes . . . . Quasi-civilian infrastructure may become a legitimate target for retaliation.”24
Risks and Responsibilities of Commercialization
The increasingly prominent role of open-source intelligence in international politics suggests that transparency is here to stay. As a result, governments will more frequently find themselves in a world with fewer national security secrets. While new commercial technologies can help states share information with allies and the public, policymakers will also need to find ways to limit the risks that transparency poses.
In some cases, this might mean finding ways to more carefully hide sensitive activity like military deployments. In other cases, governments might seek to impose tighter regulations that make it harder for commercial firms to collect and disseminate information on government activities. Hiding and regulating, however, will likely become more difficult as commercial information gathering technologies proliferate. As keeping activities hidden becomes a greater challenge, governments might be better off leveraging transparency for strategic ends—taking actions and countermeasures intended to mislead rivals about capabilities and intentions.
Commercial firms will also find themselves adapting to a more transparent world. Corporations will need to manage their newfound influence, balancing corporate interests with national security concerns. Companies will also need to develop procedures to defend their networks and infrastructure from rival interference, and collaborate with governments to devise strategies for responding to attacks.
The views presented here are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, or any of its components.
References
1 Alissa J. Rubin, Farnaz Fassihi, Eric Schmitt, and Vivian Yee, “Iran Fires on U.S. Forces at 2 Bases in Iraq, Calling It ‘Fierce Revenge.’” The New York Times, January 7, 2020; David Martin and Mary Walsh, “Who Would Live and Who Would Die: The Inside Story of the Iranian Attack on Al Asad Airbase,” CBS News, August 8, 2021.
2 Mihir Zaveri, “More Than 100 Troops Have Brain Injuries From Iran Missile Strike, Pentagon Says.” The New York Times, February 10, 2020.
3 Michelle Nichols, “At U.N., U.S. Justifies Killing Iranian Commander as Self-Defence.” Reuters, January 9, 2020; Martin and Walsh, “Who Would Live and Who Would Die: The Inside Story of the Iranian Attack on Al Asad Airbase.”
4 Martin and Walsh, “Who Would Live and Who Would Die: The Inside Story of the Iranian Attack on Al Asad Airbase.”
5 Erik Lin-Greenberg and Theo Milonopoulos, “Private Eyes in the Sky: Emerging Technology and the Political Consequences of Eroding Government Secrecy.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 65, no. 6 (February 2021): 1067-97.
6 Erik Lin-Greenberg and Theo Milonopoulos, “Private Eyes in the Sky.” Foreign Affairs, September 23, 2021; Zachery Tyson Brown and Carmen A. Medina, “The Declining Market for Secrets: U.S. Spy Agencies Must Adapt to an Open-Source World.” Foreign Affairs, March 9, 2021; Amy Zegart, Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2022): 225-50; Amy Zegart, “Open Secrets.” Foreign Affairs, February 2023; Joshua Rovner, “Secrecy in the Liberal Order.” The Kissinger Center Papers, John Hopkins SAIS, June 2023.
7 Theresa Hitchens, “NOAA Eases Licensing Restrictions on Commercial Remote Sensing.” Breaking Defense, August 9, 2023; Sandra Erwin, “Maxar Receives $192 Million Contract to Supply Imagery to U.S. Allies.” SpaceNews, February 8, 2023.
8 Tearline.mil, “About the Tearline Project.”
9 Nathan Strout, “Report: Iran Used Commercial Satellite Images to Monitor U.S. Forces Before Attack.” C4ISRNET, March 1, 2021.
10 Aidan Poling, “How a Fleet of Private Satellites Can Help Secure the U.S. Military’s Future.” Atlantic Council, February 27, 2023.
11 “Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine.” U.S. Department of Defense, May 9, 2023; Sandra Erwin, “As Russia Prepared to Invade, U.S. Opened Commercial Imagery Pipeline to Ukraine.” Space News, April 6, 2022.
12 Phil Stewart, Sabine Siebold, and Emmott Robin, “Satellite Images Prove Russian Failure to Withdraw Troops, NATO Says.” Reuters, February 16, 2022.
13 Melanee Thomas, “PDDNI Delivers Keynote at the 37th Annual Space Symposium.” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, April 2022.
14 Joby Warrick, “China is Building More than 100 New Missile Silos in its Western Desert, Analysts Say.” The Washington Post, June 30, 2021; William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “A 2nd New Nuclear Missile Base for China, and Many Questions About Strategy.” The New York Times, July 26, 2021.
15 Abraham Mahshie, “News about Chinese Silos Highlights Need for USAF to Accelerate Change, Brown Says.” Air & Space Forces Magazine, August 6, 2021.
16 Thomas Newdick, “Strategic Command Boss Encourages People To Keep Looking For More Chinese Missile Silos.” The Warzone, August 12, 2021.
17 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “In North Korea, Missile Bases Suggest a Great Deception.” The New York Times, November 12, 2018.
18 Megha Rajagopalan, Alison Killing, and Christo Buschek, “China Secretly Built A Vast New Infrastructure To Imprison Muslims.” BuzzFeed News, August 27, 2020.
19 Alex Hern, “Fitness Tracking App Strava Gives Away Location of Secret U.S. Army Bases.” The Guardian, January 28, 2018; Elis Gjevori, “Satellite Images Reveal Deployment of Israeli Missile Defence System in UAE.” Middle East Eye, October 29, 2022.
20 Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007); Swati Srivastava, “Corporate Sovereign Awakening and the Making of Modern State Sovereignty: New Archival Evidence from the English East India Company.” International Organization 76, no. 3 (March 2022): 690-712.
21 Aimee Picchi, “Meet the American Teen Tracking Russian Oligarchs’ Jets.” CBS News, March 7, 2022; Eliot Higgins, We Are Bellingcat: Global Crime, Online Sleuths, and the Bold Future of News, First Edition (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021).
22 Quoted in Ronan Farrow, “Elon Musk’s Shadow Rule.” The New Yorker, August 21, 2023.
23 Lin-Greenberg and Milonopoulos, “Private Eyes in the Sky: Emerging Technology and the Political Consequences of Eroding Government Secrecy.”
24 “Statement by Mr. Konstantin Vorontsov, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Deputy Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Thematic Discussion on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects) in the First Committee of the 77th Session of the U.N. General Assembly.” United Nations, October 26, 2022.