American strategic deterrence demands a new strategy, effective immediately.

The United States and its allies experienced nuclear coercion from adversaries throughout 2024. In March, Russia deployed tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, taunting border-sharing NATO allies like Poland and Lithuania.¹ September witnessed China’s People’s Liberation Army test-launch an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) near Kiribati, surprising the Pacific Island nation.² And as the Russo-Ukrainian war enters its third year and Xi Jinping’s gaze continues to linger on Taiwan, the potential for further nuclear escalation is likely in 2025.

Considering such coercive signaling from adversaries, the United States must pursue a bolder strategic deterrence model spearheaded by its biggest stick – the U.S. Navy’s ballistic missile nuclear submarines, also known as SSBNs. Increasing their visibility – but not their detectability – is crucial for deterrence in a fraught geo-strategic environment.

A Louder Nuclear Posture: Corbett’s Wisdom

Julian Corbett, an early 20th century naval warfare expert, wrote that to be effective, a fleet must be kept “actively in being—not merely in existence, but in active vigorous life.” Likewise, Corbett contends in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911) that navies should promote flexibility and stealth through strategic geographical dispersal of forces.³

Conventional thinking holds that routine patrols of SSBNs sufficiently fulfill the Corbettian lesson of keeping a fleet “actively in being,” but this is hardly the case in the bigger strategic picture. Corbett’s tenets are not manifested in the guidance document that details the use of those SSBNS – the Department of Defense’s Nuclear Posture Review, the most recent iteration of which was published in 2022.⁴ Restrictive in its vision for SSBNs, the document focuses on their wartime survivability and ignores their peacetime signaling power. The current dispersal of SSBNs, meanwhile, fails to meet Corbett’s requirement of diversified fleet concentration.

However, it is the very undetectability of SSBNs that allows them to offer a signaling effect arguably more resonant to global adversaries than air-based assets.

A robust, functional, strategic deterrence policy demands that operational planners unleash the full signaling potential of SSBNs and allow for their dispersal. Strategists should permit SSBNs to complete foreign port visits in ally nations (for example, the Republic of Korea, which actively demands strategic assurances from Washington).

Strategic planners should also strongly consider reviving Demonstration and Shakedown Operations (DASOs) – tests that validate and exhibit the flights of its nuclear ballistic missiles – beyond Engineering Overhauls to dispel doubts regarding material and technological at-sea readiness. Moreover, U.S. naval officials should encourage more joint and combined nuclear command and control exercises involving SSBNs. In doing all of the above, the United States will accomplish sharper, louder messaging to peer adversaries in strategic deterrence.

Benefits of Foreign Port Calls: Signaling and Survivability

After the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1991 and the USS Cole attack in 2000, U.S. planners ended SSBN port calls in foreign nations. American SSBNs conducted zero foreign port calls from 2000 to 2015, compared to at least 160 port calls from 1962 to 2000.⁵ In recent years, planners reintroduced port calls, but only with significant self-restraint. Instances include the 2016 visit to Gibraltar by the USS Rhode Island and the USS West Virginia’s stop in the British Indian Ocean Territory Diego Garcia in 2022, which the Navy publicized.⁶ However, these rare foreign port calls are too few and too sporadic.

Foreign port calls are valuable because they demonstrate a lean, agile SSBN force with a forward-deployed presence. Unexpected foreign port calls, especially, demonstrate more flexibility in posturing than the rotational, predictable patrols of recent years. Permitting SSBNs to conduct foreign port calls will reap the advantages promoted by Corbett on strategic concealment by providing geographical ambiguity in our SSBN movements.

Such port calls would also assist with survivability of the American nuclear triad’s premier assets. SSBNs remain homeported in two locations in the continental United States – Naval Base Bangor, Washington and Naval Base Kings Bay, Georgia. In the event of nuclear war, the destruction of these locations poses a major vulnerability to U.S. Strategic Command’s portfolio of nuclear options. Such a scenario would leave over 70 percent of SSBNs possibly crippled in the early stages of nuclear war. In this case, a division of assets becomes crucial. Otherwise, the United States relies on a miracle for preservation of its SSBNs, one that echoes the absence of carriers at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

The United States should reimagine its strategic fleet’s concentration by utilizing Hawaii and Guam for SSBN operations. COMSUBPAC averages one SSBN visit to Guam annually, according to press releases, but this pilgrimage forfeits a year-round presence of SSBNs in the Western Pacific theatre that would benefit American partners in the Polynesian region. The same case can be made for more SSBN visits to Faslane, Scotland in the Atlantic. As more Chinese and Russian deployers venture into patrol areas, SSBN operations in new patrol areas can avoid detection.

A Boon to Nuclear Non-Proliferation

In July 2023, following the Washington Declaration between South Korean President Yoon Seok Yeol and U.S. President Joe Biden, the USS Kentucky (SSBN-737)appeared in Busan, South Korea for the first SSBN visit in 40 years.⁷ This port call delivered a warning to Pyongyang while assuaging South Korea’s latest security concerns with China.

However, failing to renew regular SSBN visits to the peninsula may reluctantly turn South Korean politicians to considering domestic development of nuclear weapons.⁸ Such sentiments were expressed by former South Korean President Park Chung Hee in the 1970s, when he declared that the country would develop nuclear weapons if South Korea did not fall under the U.S. nuclear umbrella.⁹ When paired with the fact that more than 70 percent of South Koreans now favor acquiring nuclear weapons, American SSBN visits to South Korea take on an anti-proliferative role.¹⁰ Accordingly, these submarines should visit Busan, Jeju-do Island, and Chinhae in South Korea frequently and establish a patrol presence nearby.

Joint and Combined Operations for SSBNs

For decades, SSBNs have been excluded from international exercises, including the high-profile Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise. Yet Corbett incisively advocates for the supremacy of sophisticated joint operations. In keeping with this principle, in 2023, the United States did host South Korean partners onboard the USS Maine (SSBN-741) near Guam, giving a rare glimpse to allied nations of the technology behind SSBNs. But such visits and tours should expand to include our European partners, especially NATO commanders who know little about the SSBN platform.

In addition, USSTRATCOM should develop a complementary exercise to Exercise Global Thunder with SSBNs as the vanguard platform. Currently, Global Thunder – an annual exercise which incorporates the whole nuclear enterprise, including SSBNs – centers around the bomber leg of the triad.

Beyond joint operations, naval planners should also expand at-sea replenishments. In 2023, the USS Maine completed a vertical replenishment in the Philippine Sea by receiving equipment via two U.S. Marine Corps CH-53 Super Stallions.¹¹ This vertical replenishment within the first island chain projected a forward-deployed potential for SSBNs and the ability to coordinate maneuvers with aircraft.

Revive the DASO and Expand FCETs

DASOs primarily served to certify and validate the readiness of SSBN crews before an operational deployment after years of an asset’s being in drydock. Born in July 1960 with the USS George Washington (SSBN-598)’s test of the Polaris A-1 missile, the last DASO occurred off the coast of San Diego with the USS Louisiana (SSBN-743) in September 2023 after the boat’s engineering refuel overhaul.¹² Afterwards, the Navy announced this was the last DASO for the SSBN fleet. To date, it has also been the last SSBN flight test outside of the Follow-on Commander’s Evaluation Test (FCET) program.

Strategic planners should view DASOs and FCETs as highly visible opportunities for power projection. Reinstituting them would offer a compendium of non-nuclear displays of SSBN effectiveness. For example, completing a DASO-like simulation in-port from Kings Bay, Georgia or Bangor, Washington could demonstrate rapid SSBN responsiveness – a premium capability to counter a potential first-strike by Russia or China.

Opponents argue that a failed demonstration offers more reputational risks than rewards, citing the embarrassment suffered by HMS Vanguard in January 2024: it launched a Trident missile, and the first-stage boosters failed to ignite.¹³

However, if the United States shies away from testing its extended Trident missiles, adversaries may feel emboldened by an apparent lack of confidence of strategic planners in their own missiles. They may also be more doubtful of U.S. sea-based deterrence capabilities, especially if the last test launch on record is a failure.

A New Strategy to Counter New Technology

The U.S. is already behind in adopting a forward-presence and new operating areas for its SSBNs. If Corbett is correct, America is acquiescing command of the sea, because its adversaries have not been idle. For example, in September 2024, Russia’s Borei-class submarine Imperator Aleksandr III sailed under the Arctic from the Barents Sea to the Kamchatka Peninsula to join Russia’s annual Pacific Fleet exercise Ocean 2024.¹⁴ No American SSBNs have demonstrated Arctic capabilities.

And while the United States has not diversified its SSBN stockpile for several decades, Russia plans to deploy its Poseidon platform to its SSBN fleet in 2027.¹⁵ These nuclear-tipped torpedoes, powered by a compact nuclear reactor, have a maximum range of 10,000 kilometers, a suspected maximum speed of 100 knots, and a maximum yield of 100 megatons.¹⁶ By circumventing ballistic missile defense systems, these weapons could be a singular means to destroying an entire carrier strike group.

China has also begun to demonstrate a year-round presence for its SSBNs near Hainan Island and in the South China Sea. Beijing aims to strengthen its at-sea deterrence by building two of its next generation of SSBNs (Type 096) armed with the new intercontinental-range ballistic missile JL-3 by 2030.¹⁷ China will also likely explore opening a new patrol area front for Jin-class submarines with the Yellow Sea close to Beijing and North Korea.

In contrast, the United States has not introduced new variants to its Trident D5 missiles and has instead opted to extend the lifecycle of the missiles through an expensive life extension program.¹⁸ The new Columbia Class submarine will not enter the fleet soon; the most optimistic arrival date is 2031.¹⁹ In wake of this delay, America’s Navy must consider a new strategy to dispute the at-sea technological advancements and therefore the command of sea-based deterrence of peer competitors.

Stealth is the creed of the submariner, but it ought not be a constraint. It is time for the SSBN fleet to elevate its profile. With America unable to modernize its nuclear triads as fast as we want, a new deterrence strategy becomes vital to confront peer aggression. Inactivity emboldens hostile actors and Corbettian theory applied to SSBNs would allow for a powerful new means of nuclear power projection. The United States must consider the signaling potential of SSBNs and introduce agility in our nuclear network using its most survivable and least detectable leg.

1. Jack Detsch, “Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Are Now in Belarus,” Foreign Policy, March 3, 2024. ↩︎
2. François Diaz-Maurin,“China’s Openness about Its Latest Nuclear Missile Test Shows Growing Confidence Vis-à-Vis the United States,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 17, 2024. ↩︎
3. Andrew Lambert, The British Way of War: Julian Corbett and the Battle for a National Strategy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2021). ↩︎
4. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy. ↩︎
5. Rod Lyon, “Submarines and Nuclear Umbrellas,” The Strategist, January 4, 2023. ↩︎
6. “USS West Virginia Visits Diego Garcia during Extended Deterrence Patrol,” U.S. Pacific Fleet, December 7, 2022. ↩︎
7. Heather Mongilio, “USS Kentucky Makes Port Call in South Korea, First SSBN Visit in 40 Years,” USNI News, July 18, 2023. ↩︎
8. Karl Friedhoff, Toby Dalton, and Lami Kim, “Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 21, 2022. ↩︎
9. Nuno P. Monteiro, Alexandre Debs, “The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation,” International Security 2014; 39 (2): 7–51. ↩︎
10. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, “South Koreans Overwhelmingly Want Nuclear Weapons to Confront China and North Korea, Poll Finds,” Washington Post, February 21, 2022. ↩︎
11. Joshua Hays, “U.S. Marines Resupply Ballistic Missile Submarine in Philippine Sea,” U.S. Pacific Fleet, May 17, 2023. ↩︎
12. April Crew-Kelley, “USS Louisiana Proves Readiness of Unmatched Strategic Weapons System,” United States Navy, September 28, 2023. ↩︎
13. “A Credible Deterrent? Trident Missile Fails during Test Launch from HMS Vanguard,” Navy Lookout, February 26, 2024. ↩︎
14. Thomas Nilsen, “Two Nuclear Subs Transferred under Arctic Ice Cap,” The Barents Observer, September 17, 2024. ↩︎
15. Silky Kaur, “One nuclear-armed Poseidon torpedo could decimate a coastal city. Russia wants 30 of them,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 14, 2023. ↩︎
16. Ibid. ↩︎
17. Luke Caggiano, “China Deploys New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles,” Arms Control Today, May 2023. ↩︎
18. Missile Defense Project, “Trident D5,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 19, 2016, last modified April 23, 2024. ↩︎
19. Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, March 28, 2025. ↩︎