The Iron Curtain fell decades ago, but its legacy lives on. Despite the institutional connections tying Europe together, such as the EU and NATO, there is an emerging division in European culture and politics. While Western Europe is the continent’s historic core, the economically ascendant states of Central and Eastern Europe have a distinct approach to foreign affairs, security policy, national identity and the liberal political tradition.¹ This emerging division will shape the future of European security and trans-Atlantic relations.  

Indeed, Europe is undergoing an inversion. The political, cultural, and military confidence that once defined the capitals of Western Europe is eroding under the weight of complacency, stagnation, and illiberal thinking. Meanwhile, the states of Central and Eastern Europe — countries that were treated as Europe’s periphery for decades — now have the potential to emerge as the continent’s most serious, resilient, and strategically-minded actors. The war in Ukraine will likely accelerate this transformation, and to a certain extent it already has done so.  

In order to make the most of this moment, Central and Eastern European leaders must recognize their strategic opportunities and overcome the internal and external constraints that stand in their way. 

The Paradox of the “Original West”

Central and Eastern Europe has long been viewed by its western neighbors through the prism of backwardness: an economically lagging region recovering from decades of authoritarian rule. Many view it as “still catching up” with the West. Once partially accurate, this lens now obscures more than it reveals.  

Paradoxically, the Central and Eastern European region today may represent a more faithful continuation of Western traditions than many of the societies that avoided Soviet domination. Thanks in part to Communist regimes’ attempts to suppress this cultural and intellectual heritage, Central and Eastern Europeans preserved in their collective memory a more authentic image of “the West” as a concept, including its original aspirations and institutions: family, religion, national identity, among others. Communist ideology mostly failed to fully penetrate the deep structures of occupied societies. By contrast, in Western Europe, these values have undergone a gradual process of erosion. 

When the Iron Curtain fell, Western Europe imagined that the newly freed states would quickly modernize by adopting its contemporary cultural norms. Instead, Central and Eastern Europeans idealized the West of the older past, a vision the Czech novelist Milan Kundera powerfully captured in his 1984 essay “The Tragedy of Central Europe.”²  Kundera argued that Central Europe’s resistance to Soviet influence was fundamentally about preserving their “European” cultural identity, also called “Westernness.”³ He suggested that the experience of defending this heritage led the Soviet-occupied nations to value Western civilization more than their neighbors on the other side of the Iron Curtain. As Kundera wrote:  

“The identity of a people and of a civilization is reflected and concentrated in what has been created by the mind — in what is known as ‘culture.’ If this identity is threatened with extinction, cultural life grows correspondingly more intense, more important, until culture itself becomes the living value around which all people rally. That is why, in each of the [anti-Soviet] revolts in Central Europe, the collective cultural memory and the contemporary creative effort assumed roles so great and so decisive — far greater and far more decisive than they have been in any other European mass revolt.”⁴

The result is a region wary of the post-national, hyper-progressive cultural ideas that arguably dominate the governing class in Western Europe. Decades of Marxist rule and ideological servitude gave Central Europeans a unique understanding of what it means to be “Western” and taught us how quickly an ideology can claim moral authority, suppress dissent, and reshape social norms in the name of “progress.” That wariness has become a defining axis of many political conflicts within the European Union between old and new member states.⁵ The dispute reaches beyond policy and touches on Europe’s philosophical core.

History as Strategic Doctrine 

No concept is more central for understanding the Central and Eastern European region than historical memory. In Western Europe, historical reflection often doubles as moral self-flagellation.⁶ In Central and Eastern Europe, history informs geopolitical strategy.  

Take, for example, the Czech trauma of the Munich Agreement of 1938, when Britain, Italy, and France compelled Czechoslovakia to surrender the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany under the illusion that appeasement would preserve peace. The consequences were devastating, offering a brutal lesson on the fatal flaws of appeasement politics and the existential danger of relying on distant, indifferent allies.⁷

Munich taught the region that Western security guarantees, though often sincere, may collapse under political fear, ideological naiveté, or the temptation to sacrifice small nations to avoid confronting large dangers. This lesson should deeply resonate today. Sovereignty cannot be outsourced. Military capability matters more than declarations. And freedom, once lost, is not easily regained. From this lesson, a clear doctrine emerges: Central and Eastern European states must never again be dependent on the political will of Western Europe for their survival. 

This historical memory continues to shape regional attitudes toward Russia. It explains why countries like Poland, the Baltic states, and Czechia respond to Russian aggression with clarity.⁸ The West looks at Moscow and sees a problem to be managed. The East looks at Moscow and sees an existential threat.⁹

History also shapes regional attitudes toward the United States, the only major power that has consistently supported the sovereignty of Central and Eastern European states. America championed the creation of new nations in 1918 under Wilsonian principles of self-determination. It maintained the moral and legal non-recognition of Soviet annexations after 1945. It backed the democratic revolutions of 1989 with diplomatic, economic, and moral support.¹⁰ The result is a profound pro-American sentiment unmatched in Western Europe.  

This openness to trans-Atlantic interdependence has become an enormous advantage in the 21^st century, when progress in frontier technologies is concentrated in Silicon Valley.

Emerging Technologies and Trans-Atlantic Interdependence 

In 1920, Czech writer Karel Čapek coined the term “Robot” in his play R.U.R. It is a poetic beginning of the throughline from the region’s cultural history to the genesis of modern AI. Now, a century later, the embrace of AI and other emerging technologies is becoming an essential driver of economic and military strength. 

Paradox again defines Central and Eastern Europe’s strength here. The region does not possess entrenched legacy technology industries or longstanding bureaucratic structures for technology procurement. Consequently, they face fewer barriers to rapid AI-driven modernization. Western European states have found rapid modernization and AI adoption challenging due to their extensive regulatory frameworks and strong anti-American sentiment, which cascades to American technology companies.¹¹

In contrast, countries like Poland, Estonia, or Czechia may implement this groundbreaking technology at unprecedented speed. Estonia’s digital governance and Poland’s defense procurements offer glimpses of what is possible.^xii There should, however, be much more. AI can become a force multiplier, enhancing administrative efficiency, strengthening cybersecurity, optimizing logistics, and accelerating decision-making in both civilian and military contexts.

Central and Eastern Europe has already demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for rapid and disruptive transformation. It had arguably one of the most successful post-authoritarian recoveries of the 20th century. In the 1990s and 2000s, Central and Eastern European societies emerging from centrally planned economies rebuilt entire market structures from scratch. They privatized industries and established modern banking systems. They integrated into global supply chains and aligned their institutional frameworks with EU and NATO standards in a fraction of the time Western Europe took for comparable transitions.

This historical precedent matters. It demonstrates that the region can reform at speed. It can absorb new technologies aggressively and significantly adjust its economic models. The same adaptability that enabled the post-Communist transformation can now be directed toward AI adoption. Central and Eastern European states must embrace AI with the same urgency, discipline, and openness they brought to their earlier post-1990s reforms. If they do, they can leapfrog older, more structurally rigid Western economies. They can become early adopters, fast integrators, and regional leaders in the next wave of technological modernization. In this sense, AI becomes a geopolitical equalizer.

Natural American Partners

Central and Eastern Europe lacks a domestic AI development ecosystem. Unlike the United States, it does not host hyperscale computing infrastructure, capital-rich AI startups, or foundational model research hubs. On the surface, this appears to be a disadvantage. Yet there may also be a silver lining. 

In states where domestic tech industries wield significant political influence, regulators face pressure to protect incumbents. They may slow disruptive innovation or negotiate painful compromises. Western Europe’s technology policies and regulations reflect precisely such a dynamic, often defended by consumer protection rhetoric or the idea of “digital sovereignty.”¹² They try to protect their unsuccessful tech companies at all costs.¹³ However, these conflicts barely exist in Central and Eastern Europe. With no legacy technology industry to protect, the region can adopt American innovations with exceptional speed.

This has important geopolitical implications. It may reinforce the region’s alignment with the United States – not as passive consumers, but as enthusiastic adopters of the most advanced technologies available. It may effectively bind the region technologically to the United States, creating a trans-Atlantic technological corridor. By facilitating technological cooperation with the United States, dependency may become a strategic advantage. It allows Central and Eastern Europe to plug into the world’s most advanced technological ecosystem, while increasing the importance of the region as an economic and military partner to the United States. 

Geography of Distrust

Geography and historical memory should create a regional strategic mindset defined not by paranoia but by realism. Russia looms to the East, not as an abstract threat but as a living historical antagonist. Its actions continually validate Central and Eastern European concerns and offer warnings to the West.  

The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 crystallized this reality. While Western Europe hesitated, their Eastern neighbors acted. Poland became the logistical heart of the Western effort.¹⁴ The Baltic states took positions of immediate unconditional support for Ukraine.¹⁵ Czechia’s rapid provision of artillery systems and ammunition to Ukraine demonstrated both courage and competence.¹⁶

The region’s geography, combined with its historical memory, produces clarity: Russia must be deterred. Appeasement politics does not work. And deterrence is a matter of military power. This is why Poland is building one of the largest land forces in Europe.¹⁷ It explains why Estonia invests heavily in cyber and intelligence infrastructure, and why Lithuania and Latvia push aggressively for forward defense. For these states, defense is not optional; it is existential.

This realism should also extend to Central and Eastern Europeans’ view of Western Europe. Germany’s decades-long reliance on Russian gas and France’s ambivalence are warning signs.¹⁸ Western and Southern Europe’s unwillingness to spend on military needs should confirm long-standing suspicions that they may not be reliable in times of military crisis.¹⁹

Realistic distrust should not take the form of hostility but of independence. Central and Eastern European states must believe deeply in NATO. However, they must be equally prepared for a scenario where Western European political will falters. They must ensure themselves against another Munich 1938. 

Europe’s and Internal Structural Obstacles 

Despite its rising strategic significance, Central and Eastern Europe also faces formidable obstacles. Many are internally created, while others originate from the structural design of the European Union. The most significant EU constraint is regulatory overreach. The European Union’s regulatory apparatus is often driven by ideological agendas and bureaucratic self-preservation. It imposes constraints on energy diversification, the defense industry, and, increasingly, the adoption of artificial intelligence.²⁰ 

The Central and Eastern European region also faces a profound demographic challenge marked by rapid population aging and persistent emigration.²¹ This erosion of human capital reduces labor availability, undermines innovation capacity, and places growing pressure on social and pension systems. 

At the same time, structural economic weaknesses limit the region’s ability to move up the value chain. Low productivity, underinvestment in innovation, and a heavy reliance on foreign-owned manufacturing constrain the development of homegrown technological ecosystems.²² Weak institutional quality and persistent political polarization further slow reforms, diminish trust, and deter both domestic and external investors necessary for sustainable growth. 

Compounding these issues are shortcomings in education systems, which often lag behind the skills demanded by modern industries. Combined with geopolitical uncertainty and heightened security risks since 2022, the region faces increasing vulnerability. Without substantial modernization of institutions, infrastructure investments, and a strong emphasis on education, the region risks stagnation.  

Despite their growing importance, many Central and Eastern European states still also carry an inferiority complex. They have an internalized perception of being Europe’s “junior partners,” which is both outdated and harmful. It prevents ambitious thinking and limits political boldness. To become Europe’s engine, the region must first believe it can lead. It would significantly help for the United States to actively embrace and treat the nations here as true allies and partners. 

Overcoming these issues will require deliberate reform and professionalization. It demands a renewed commitment to strengthening state institutions that are capable of meeting the demands of the AI age.  

Europe’s New Engine

To channel these qualities into a new geopolitical reality, Central and Eastern Europe must articulate and pursue a coherent strategic vision. This vision begins with acknowledging that the European engine has already started to shift eastward.  

Its first component should be deepening strategic integration with the United States. This is not a rejection of Europe. It is an affirmation of the only alliance that has consistently safeguarded the region’s sovereignty, safety, and freedom.  

The second component involves rapid modernization across the government, defense, and economy. The region can become a laboratory for high-velocity technological transformation, a proving ground for AI to enhance state capacity, responsible administration, and military deterrence.  

The third component should be cultural self-confidence. Central and Eastern Europe must understand that their values — favoring individual freedom and strong national identity — are not provincial relics but essential components of Western civilization. They are the very values that Western Europe once embodied but has gradually abandoned.  

Conclusion

Central and Eastern Europe’s culture, historical memory, and technological potential place it at the heart of Europe’s future. If it embraces advanced technologies, asserts military independence, and overcomes constraints, the region may become the engine of a renewed Western order – one which remembers Munich 1938, resists Moscow, and rejects the bureaucratic ideologies that mistake regulation for progress. The next chapter of Europe’s story may be written in Warsaw, Prague, Tallinn, and Vilnius: cities where history has not been forgotten, national defense is taken seriously, and freedom is not negotiable. 

1. The term Central and Eastern Europe in my definition refers specifically to Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). This definition is positioned in contrast to the countries of Western, Eastern, Southern and Northern Europe. ↩︎
2. Milan Kundera, “The Tragedy of Central Europe,” The New York Review of Books, April 26, 1984.  ↩︎
3. Ibid. ↩︎
4. Ibid. ↩︎
5. This divergence manifests as a suspicion against illiberal measures increasingly favored by current Western leadership. The region’s preference for strong free speech and privacy is born of the memory of state surveillance, control and the ideological policing of speech. ↩︎
6. Eric Heinze, Coming Clean: The Rise of Critical Theory and the Future of the Left (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2025). ↩︎
7. Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia Between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). ↩︎
8. Hungary represents an exception: its historical memory is shaped less by fears of Russian domination and more by the trauma of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. The loss of two-thirds of its territory and the fate of Hungarian minorities in neighboring states overshadow the anti-Soviet legacy that defines perceptions in Poland, the Baltics, or Czechia. ↩︎
9. Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). ↩︎
10. Albright, Madeleine. “The Role of the United States in Central Europe.” Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 38, no. 1 (1991): 71–84. ↩︎
11. Mathieu Pollet, Frida Preuss, and Océane Herrero, “Germany Wakes Up to US Tech Dominance,” Politico Europe, November 19, 2025. ↩︎
12. Laio, “Germany and France endorse EuroStack for tech sovereignty,” IO+, April 10, 2025. ↩︎
13. Digital Markets Act, drafted largely in France and Germany, targets “gatekeepers” that are almost exclusively American firms. Sovereignty-driven projects such as Gaia-X, the Schrems II–triggered restrictions on transatlantic data flows, and France’s ban on Microsoft’s cloud for sensitive government data further illustrate a regulatory posture aimed at limiting U.S. technological influence. Germany’s advocacy for “European AI models” and the Western-led architecture of the EU AI Act reinforce this pattern, revealing how domestic industrial interests shape continental regulation. ↩︎
14. Kateryna Serohina, “Poland reports how much aid Ukraine received through logistics hub in Jasionka,” RBC-Ukraine, December 24, 2024. ↩︎
15. Isabella Hannén and Jason C. Moyer, “The Baltic States’ Contributions to Ukraine,” Ukraine in Europe (Wilson Center, January 29, 2024). ↩︎
16. Vadim Kushnikov, “The Czech Republic revealed how many armored vehicles and weapons it provided to Ukraine,” Militarnyi, February 23, 2023. ↩︎
17. Wilson Center, “Security in Europe: Poland’s Rise as NATO’s Defense Spending Leader,” November 20, 2023. ↩︎
18. New York Times. “Shadowy Arm of a German State Helped Russia Finish Nord Stream 2.” December 2, 2022; Zaretsky, Robert. “Ambivalence About Moscow Is a French Tradition.” Foreign Affairs, December 30, 2019. ↩︎
19. Pazos, Victoria. “EU defence plan needs Italy and Spain to get on board.” European Interest, May 9, 2025. ↩︎
20. European Commission, The European Green Deal, COM(2019) 640 final (Brussels, 11 December 2019); Crouch, David, and Matthew C. H. Smith. “Are ESG Standards a Scapegoat for Stalling Defence Growth?” RUSI, 27 February 2025; European Union. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). ↩︎
21. Cristina Batog, et al., Demographic Headwinds in Central and Eastern Europe, European Departmental Paper Series No. 19/12 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2019). ↩︎
22. Matteo Ferrazzi, Jochen Schanz, and Marcin Wolski, Growth and competitiveness in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: The role of innovation, EIB Working Paper 2025/01 (Luxembourg: European Investment Bank, 2025). ↩︎