The United States of America is beginning the multipolar era with an enviable position on the global chess board. If one imagines a three-way game, the other two players, Russia and China, are in far weaker positions. America’s hemisphere is currently free of serious adversaries and the Trump Corollary, declared last December, has made clear the United States will continue to keep adversaries out of the Western hemisphere and the North Atlantic.¹ By contrast, China finds itself hemmed in, unable to act beyond the first island chain. And Russia is still bogged down in the Russo-Ukrainian War, a conflict that has resulted in even more NATO member states appearing on its borders.

Which all likely explains the Trump administration’s efforts thus far in Iran. The Islamic Republic is a close ally of both Moscow and Beijing, helping them project power in the Middle East and providing both with differing kinds of aid. Russia’s efforts in the Russo-Ukrainian War were aided by Iranian-made drones, and China saves billions per year on Iranian oil imports.² Iran’s location also allows it to control the Strait of Hormuz and, until Israel was able to decimate their proxies, gave it a strong perch from which to influence events across the entire Middle East. Dislodging the regime and replacing it with a liberal democracy, or at least a pro-Western government, could therefore pay dividends. This all does not even consider the moral argument: that Tehran’s regime is sadistic and cruel, torturing and killing women for walking down the street with their hair out and executing prisoners, and the world would be better off without it.

The administration is currently weighing its options, which range from diplomatic criticism to cyber-attacks to regime-ending kinetic strikes. But even with all of the above, the Trump administration should pause before delivering the finishing blow.

The moral argument should, as heartless as it may sound, be put aside. No policymakers are demanding the United States bomb rebel camps in Sudan – where significantly more innocents have been massacred than in Iran – nor were there calls for America to intervene in Myanmar’s recent Rohingya genocide. Intervening anywhere and everywhere in such a way is no different from the globe-trotting Bush Doctrine which President Trump explicitly ran against in 2016. Instead, the United States should act abroad only when it is strictly within its national interests to do so.

So then what about the geopolitical arguments? On paper, knocking out the regime would end Tehran’s long reign of terror over the Middle East and would deprive Russia and China of a major ally in a key region. In a best-case scenario, it would even create an American ally and perch from which Washington could watch Moscow and Beijing.

The problem here is that “best case scenarios” do not often come to pass. For starters, there is no reason to assume that a post-Ayatollah Iran will be a forward-thinking, liberal democratic paradise. Advocates of intervention excitedly passed around a poll last year which showed that over 80% of Iranians do not want the regime to continue.³ But that poll was conducted by an organization with ties to supporters of regime change and only reached those who use VPNs; there is no indication whatsoever that it is reflective of on-the-ground reality.⁴ Besides, even individuals who want the regime overthrown are not necessarily a monolithically liberal democratic block. Many could be Islamists unhappy with Tehran’s recent failures.

Here – the notion that a post-Iran could become an Islamic breeding ground – is also cause for concern. Warnings of repeating the Iraq War are often overstated, but without a clear, ready successor, there is nothing which could stop Iran from becoming a place the Islamic State, or a similar group, could find itself a home. Allowing a re-ignition of the Islamic State would genuinely require further intervention, as such a group would be eager to conduct terror attacks on Americans.

Islamism also runs deep through Iran’s society. After nearly fifty years, it touches all parts of the country’s governing apparatus. There may be some in that apparatus who are not happy with the mullahs, but that does not mean they are unhappy with Islamic law. Past attempts to strip populations of dangerous ideologies – such as Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan – took decades of occupation. In Germany’s case, it took splitting the country in half, filling both sides with American and Soviet soldiers, and bombarding both sides with capitalistic or communistic propaganda for forty years. In Japan’s case, it took the shock of two atomic bombs and an occupation by tens of thousands of American soldiers. There is no reason to assume that Iranians, particularly those who have overseen the country, will discard the entirety of their views without similar efforts.

The United States has already seen what happens when it seeks to create democracy in places where it has never existed via light occupations. Iraq is technically a democracy today, but it is one which passes laws to allow for child marriage, hardly a bragging point for Washington.⁵ And in Afghanistan, democracy simply never took. Could a better (or functioning) democracy have been established in either place? Perhaps, if the United States had occupied both with tens of thousands of troops over a hundred year period, as the late Senator John McCain once argued for.⁶ But polls and every recent election result indicate that Americans are not in any mood for such prolonged nation building anywhere, much less Iran, a country larger than both Iraq and Afghanistan put together. And there is no reason to even assume that such an occupation would work in the first place – nor that it would be in America’s interest to conduct one.

Even if a healthy democracy took root, there is nothing to guarantee such a state would not still remain friendly with Moscow and Beijing. Both states are significantly geographically closer to China and Russia, and may simply gain more from being friendly with them. What would the United States do if the ayatollahs are overthrown and a new liberal democratic parliament happily continues to work closely with our adversaries? Washington would be in an arguably worse spot than it is now.

Introducing some sort of pro-American dictator, as the West did with the Shah, should be out of the question. Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed Shah, has sought to place himself at the center of opposition to the regime. But there is no reason to assume he would be able to simply waltz in and take power, even as a ceremonial monarch.⁷ The Islamic revolution was built on the back of popular revulsion to his father’s rule, a revulsion which expanded far beyond just Islamists. Could the Iranian people welcome the Shah’s family back into power? Perhaps; truly understanding the Iranian opposition movement as it exists within Iran itself – and not from expats who safely talk on TV in New York and London – is difficult, difficult enough to question whether or not risking the fall of the regime is worth it.

After all, the United States is not, as discussed earlier, in a terrible spot right now. Russia and China are stuck providing aid to a weak, tottering regime. Tehran is barely able to control its own people, much less spread its tentacles across the Middle East as it could only a few short years ago. Iran’s nuclear program was damaged by last year’s Operation Midnight Hammer, and the country’s complete incapability to respond to those attacks indicates that they would not be able to stop the United States from conducting more airstrikes if it was necessary to further degrade their nuclear program.

This is not to say America should do nothing whatsoever; after all, President Trump promised protestors, “Help is on its way,” and while credibility is a slightly over-stated concern in international relations, such an explicit promise should be backed up somehow.⁸ Thus far, the Trump administration’s actions – tariffs on Iran’s trade partners and the calling of an emergency United Nations Security Council meeting – are good starts.⁹ The administration could also engage in quieter cyber-attacks, targeting the regime’s communications in an effort to hinder its ability to collaborate and kill more protestors. The pressure campaign, restarted by the Trump administration, should continue, in order to keep China and Russia tied to a nearly-dead weight.

The goal of chess is not to conquer every square and take every piece from your opponent. Sending a rook charging across the board may seem bold and can pay off, but it can also invite immense risks which seriously damage one’s position. And the United States is in a phenomenal position from which to navigate the decades to come.

This is not to say risks should never be taken, but that they should only be taken when necessary. The recent intervention into Venezuela, for example, was critical for upholding the Trump Corollary and taking Caracas off the board for adversaries. But it remains an open question whether intervening into Iran is likewise worthwhile.

1. Anthony J. Constantini. “The Trump Corollary: Revitalizing the Monroe Doctrine for a New Era.” Defense Analyses Research Collective (DARC), November 21, 2025. ↩︎
2. Emma Burrows. “Drone Debris Found in Ukraine Indicates Russia Is Using New Technology from Iran.” Associated Press, June 25, 2025; “China’s Heavy Reliance on Iranian Oil Imports.” Reuters, January 13, 2026. ↩︎
3. “Majority of Iranians Reject Islamic Republic, Survey Finds.” Iran International, August 21, 2025. ↩︎
4. Sam Carlen and Iain Carlos. “‘Ideological,’ ‘Not Scientific’: Iran Polling Firm GAMAAN Flawed, Not Independent.” Noir News, February 27, 2025. ↩︎
5. “Iraq’s New Law Allowing Children as Young as 9 to Marry Undermines Women and Girls’ Rights.” Walk Free, January 31, 2025. ↩︎
6. “McCain defends ‘100 years in Iraq’ statement.” CNN, February 14, 2008. ↩︎
7. Tamara Qiblawi. “The Son of Iran’s Last Shah Is Rallying Protesters. But Do Iranians Really Want Another King?” CNN, January 9, 2026. ↩︎
8. Katherine Doyle, Courtney Kube, Julie Tsirkin, and Gordon Lubold. “Trump Would Want Military Action in Iran to Be Swift and Decisive, Sources Say.” NBC News, January 14, 2026. ↩︎
9. Lynsey Chutel. “Trump Says He Will Impose a 25 Percent Tariff on Countries Trading With Iran.” New York Times, January 13, 2026; Bridget Brown, Sylvia Hui, Curtis Yee, Anna-Catherine Brigida, and Nell Clark/ “UN Security Council Discusses Iran’s Deadly Protests after US Request.” Associated Press, January 15, 2026. ↩︎