“Per Ardua Ad Astra”: The UK’s Orbital Imperative

“Per Ardua Ad Astra”: The UK’s Orbital Imperative

As Britain seeks to revive its defense capabilities in a more contested world, it must focus on developing true independence within the space ISR domain — the new frontier of military and economic security.

In July 2024, the United Kingdom government commissioned a Strategic Defence Review, charting a path for an overhaul of British military capabilities.1 This has provided a unique opportunity for policymakers to rethink the UK’s approach to national security.2

Consensus is emerging among the defense community: in a more dangerous and contested world, dominated by aggression from Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing, Britain cannot spread its capabilities thinly or rely on incremental improvements. The United Kingdom needs more ambitious thinking regarding the acute threats facing the realm. While the government’s commitment to raise defence spending to 2.5 percent of GDP is vital, this is not enough.3 To retain strategic influence, Britain’s ambition must extend above the skies.

Adversaries are investing aggressively in niche technologies that yield disproportionate benefits. Among these, space is emerging as the ultimate strategic frontier – increasingly perceived as a distinct arena of competition rather than merely an enabler for air, sea, or land operations.4

Advancements in space-to-earth and in-space technologies are central to the modern nervous system of warfare and diplomacy. Yet, despite early and historic strengths, the United Kingdom is only now developing its own military imaging capabilities.5 Remarkably, the UK defense leadership mentioned space for the first time in the Integrated Review of 2021.6

To deter, defend, and compete effectively, Britain must treat space seriously again. This will benefit both Western security and national prosperity: the United Kingdom can tap into a burgeoning space market expected to exceed £400 billion by 2030.7 However, making real progress requires political commitment and financial backing.

Britain’s Blind Spot

Britain has historically played a leading role in space. In 1969, the United Kingdom launched Skynet1A, the world’s first military satellite in geostationary orbit.8 While this initial mission and two successive attempts ended in failure, the launch of Skynet2B in 1974 charted a path for newer, more sophisticated technologies enabling secure global communication.9 Skynet’s sovereign functionalities were essential in providing vital military services from the Falklands War to the First Gulf War.10

The global threats of this century, however, have evolved significantly in the time since. Intelligence, security, and reconnaissance (ISR) imaging is now a key frontier for space warfare, and it is vital that Britain seizes the full potential of this opportunity. The United Kingdom has historically relied heavily on the United States or commercial partners for space imaging capabilities. It is only now developing its own – as the last G7 country to do so.

In August 2024, Tyche was launched, the first British sovereign military imaging satellite, owned by the Ministry of Defence and operated by UK Space Command.11 It will operate in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) until 2029, performing surface-level electro-optical imaging. Three more LEO demonstrators – Titania, Oberon, and Juno – will be launched by 2027, testing a range of in-space and space-to-earth technologies.12

These are part of the £127 million MINERVA project, the first phase of Britain’s £986 million intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ISTARI program.13 ISTARI’s aim is to develop a constellation of satellites to deliver global surveillance capabilities for military and civilian purposes by 2031. Tyche and Juno are optical satellites that form the backbone of the program; Oberon will be a cluster of synthetic aperture radar (SAR) versatile satellites, and Titania will specialize in revolutionary direct-to-Earth laser communications.14

Put simply, it has taken too long for Britain to seize this moment. With years of institutional stasis and funding concerns hampering efforts, Britain should learn from Ukraine, which crowdfunded its own SAR “People’s Satellite” during wartime conditions.15 If Britain summons this same ambition, it could still lead in the space ISR domain and in the unfolding orbital arms race.

Independence, Not Isolation

Before addressing the significance of imaging and what Britain needs to succeed, we must consider why sovereign capabilities matter. Defense co-operation should bring Western allies closer, harnessing collective strength for global security. However, Britain should thrive with partners – not rely on them. National resilience is paramount.     

In the successful rollout of ISTARI, all G7 countries will possess satellite imaging capabilities, bringing unique strengths to the collective mosaic. This means reduced shared failures and mitigated threats to Britain’s security whilst securing its place in NATO. 

Sovereign capabilities also have real-world operational benefits. Historically, Britain has been reliant on the United States for imagery, with access dependent on American excess capacity.16 As a result, short-term monitoring proves difficult, because it is challenging to monitor specific assets at high frequency. Britain must be able to act quickly in a world where speed and efficacy matter most. In the geographical circumstances of the Falklands War, for example, the United Kingdom could not rely on the United States for satellite communications, which provided reason to develop Skynet as its own.17

Most importantly, investing in sovereign ISR must serve as a signaling mechanism to deter the UK’s adversaries. As British space launch capacity develops, this will send a clear message to hostile nations of the island nation’s strength and resolve. The stakes are too high for anything less.

A Wider Potential

Investing in sovereign ISR is vital to enhancing the UK defense’s potency and boosting allied security. However, exciting potential also lies in the longer-term commercial opportunities at play, which could be a catalyst for economic growth, societal benefits, and British technological leadership.

In backing these capabilities, Britain benefits from unlocking the potential of high-growth UK-based space engineering companies. In December 2024, UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) announced the launch of a new national facility for small satellite instrument testing, empowering SMEs with services to calibrate their instruments – crucial support for those who lacked the expertise and funding.18

Cabinet Minister Pat McFadden recently called for the state to become “more like a start-up.”19 Such an ethos, if applied to Britain’s space strategy, will reap rewards far beyond military security; it will unlock new markets. Given Britain aims to capture 10 percent of the projected £400 billion global space market by 2030, these are just the types of investment the nation should be making.20

The Strategic Defence Review urges Britain to adopt a more entrepreneurial mindset, encouraging UK defense leaders to involve the private sector and allow prototypes to move quickly to operational readiness. This will develop a mutually beneficial ecosystem with a lucrative positive feedback loop. This is most clearly illustrated through the potential of British space ports, which can ensure a resilient and financially viable future for the United Kingdom.21

Commercial ISR potential is most promising in high-value emerging markets, such as space debris management and asteroid mining. By 2030, projections say 100,000 satellites will be in orbit, increasing debris monitoring and in-orbit servicing.22 Asteran, which measures the potential value of asteroids tracked by NASA, estimates that mining the top 10 most cost-effective asteroids could yield around U.S. $1.5 trillion in profit.23 Securing these opportunities will fortify the UK’s defense posture and shape a new economic landscape in orbit – an approach which, by moving beyond a state of terrestrial myopia, will position Britain for long-term success.

The ISTARI constellation will also contribute to natural disaster monitoring and climate change mapping. As a result, there is significant dual-use potential to protect wider society, which must also be prioritized.24

What Britain Needs

For Britain to secure its future in space it must deliver the ambition, resources, and infrastructure to match. The following four areas are vital:

Funding: In the UK’s 2022 Space Defence Strategy, £6.4 billion was allocated over 10 years to position Britain in the orbital domain.25 £5 billion was dedicated to Skynet and £1.4 billion  for ISR capabilities, including the ISTARI constellation and its first stage, MINERVA.26 This is insufficient. Greater investment is essential to securing national security while unlocking private-sector innovation.

Ground Infrastructure: Britain’s defense capabilities are only as strong as the assets that support them. In 2020, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) demonstrated Hermes, a relocatable mission operations base that restored the Ministry of Defence’s communication with satellites for the first time in two decades.27 Dstl is now enhancing ground facilities to support ISTARI, through two remote ground stations at Goonhilly Space Station in Cornwall.28  UK defense must also build a common language for their network  to scale sustainably.

Imaging Technology: The quantity and quality of ISR satellites matter equally. Tyche and Juno, forming the backbone of MINERVA, are optical satellites that provide imagery, but are limited to daylight conditions.29 SAR, powering Oberon, overcomes these restraints and is capable of collecting imagery through clouds or foliage and at night.30

However, the greatest potential for Britain’s competitiveness in space lies in hyperspectral imaging. This imaging achieves high resolution and reveals the chemical and physical properties of materials.31 Ukraine has leveraged these technologies, with great effect, on the battlefield. This frontier of intelligence must be championed by UK Defence to remain competitive.32 By harnessing private-sector expertise, imaging  can unlock use cases across the asteroid mining market. 

Data Processing and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Acquiring top-tier data is the first step; extracting insights is the competitive differentiator. AI-driven analytics can convert raw imagery into actionable intelligence for quick decision-making. The more competitive the processing capabilities, the greater strategic edge on the battlefield.

France’s Artemis data program, for example, allows consolidation of multi-source data and analysis autonomously.33 Britain must similarly invest in frameworks that bring together variety of information to enable rapid, evidence-based action.

Lessons Of Whittle and Skylark

Historically, Britain has led technological innovation, from Frank Whittle’s jet engine designs to the Skylark sounding rocket’s progress into space research. However, both Whittle’s invention and the Skylark received inadequate state backing and missed chances to build upon their historic success, illustrating the cost of failing to seize the impetus of innovation.

Whittle’s jet engine, patented in 1930, could have granted Britain years of advantage in the air had it been supported promptly.34 Hans Von Ohain, who was also working to design a jet engine for Germany, believed the Second World War would not have begun if Germany had known of Whittle’s discovery in Britain.35 Funding and bureaucratic delays prevented Whittle’s technology  from altering the course of history. 

The Skylark rocket contributed groundbreaking insights for science, including the very first X-ray surveys of the southern sky and the earliest ultraviolet imaging.36 However, it lost official support in 1978, and its final flight took place in 2005. Sadly, Britain is the only country in the world to have once possessed satellite launch capabilities and then abandoned them.

The lesson is clear: failure to back innovative technologies with confidence costs long-term strength and influence. The same principles still apply today. By embracing sovereignty in ISR, even at this late stage, the United Kingdom can harness its world-class engineering, intelligence acumen, and thriving aerospace sector to build a competitive edge.

In a more dangerous world, strategic and technological advantage matters above all. In space, Britain must embrace this principle – in full – to deter its enemies and boost allied security, while seizing the wider opportunities that await.

  1. Ministry of Defence, “The Strategic Defence Review,” GOV.UK, July 17, 2024. ↩︎
  2. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), “A New Approach to the UK Strategic Defence Review: Tests of Success,” RUSI, October 9, 2024. ↩︎
  3. 10 Downing Street, “PM Says Step Up in Defence Spending Can Safeguard the Future of NATO,” GOV.UK, July 9, 2024. ↩︎
  4. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), “Between Ambition and Reality: How Space Fits UK Defence Framework,” RUSI, July 16, 2024. ↩︎
  5. BBC News, “UK’s Strategic Defence Review: Key Insights and Implications,” BBC News, August 16, 2024. ↩︎
  6. King’s College London, “A Meaningful Space in the Integrated Review,” King’s College London, October 11, 2021. ↩︎
  7. Ministry of Defence, “IGS Action Plan,” GOV.UK, 2014. ↩︎
  8. Royal Signals Museum, “On This Day – 22 November,” Royal Signals Museum, undated. ↩︎
  9. Ibid. ↩︎
  10. National Archives, “Skynet: The Real Communication Satellite System,” National Archives Blog, October 24, 2019. ↩︎
  11. Ministry of Defence, “UK Space Command Successfully Launches First Military Satellite,” GOV.UK, August 17, 2024. ↩︎
  12. Janes’ Defence, “All UK MINERVA Satellites to Launch by 2026,” Janes’ OSINT Insights, December 14, 2023. ↩︎
  13. Ministry of Defence, “Designing Defence’s Next Generation Multi-Satellite System,” GOV.UK, October 23, 2024. ↩︎
  14. Ministry of Defence, “Satellite Deal Signed for Advanced Military Tech,” GOV.UK, November 4, 2024; “Breakthroughs in Space Technology: What They Mean for Defence,” BBC News, September 11, 2019; Ministry of Defence, “£95m Investment for Military Space Communications,” GOV.UK, August 9, 2021. ↩︎
  15. Politico Europe, “Ukraine’s Satellite Targets Russian Crowdfunded Intelligence Efforts,” Politico, July 1, 2024. ↩︎
  16. Douglas Barrie, “UK Defence Space Strategy’s Orbital Success,” IISS, February 11, 2022. ↩︎
  17. National Archives, “Skynet: The Real Communication Satellite System,” National Archives Blog, October 24, 2019. ↩︎
  18. UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), “New Small Satellite Facility to Boost UK Earth Observation Sector,” UKRI, December 5, 2024. ↩︎
  19. Cabinet Office, “Pat McFadden Vows to Make the State More Like a Start-Up as He Deploys Reform Teams Across Country,” GOV.UK, December 9, 2024. ↩︎
  20. Ministry of Defence, “IGS Action Plan,” GOV.UK, 2014. ↩︎
  21. King’s College London, “The Strategic Edge of Sovereign Space Launch,” King’s College London, August 12, 2022. ↩︎
  22. European Commission, “Preventing Outer Space from Becoming a Hazardous Junkyard,” Horizon Magazine, August 30, 2023. ↩︎
  23. Shriya Yarlagadda, “Economics of the Stars,” Harvard Intelligence Review, April 8, 2022 ↩︎
  24. Ministry of Defence, “Tyche Ellite DES Space Command Launch,” Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), August 17, 2024. ↩︎
  25. House of Commons, “POST-PN-0654,” Parliament UK, September, 2021. ↩︎
  26. GOV.UK, “UK Cutting Edge Space Defence Backed by £14 Billion,” GOV.UK, February 1, 2022. ↩︎
  27. Ministry of Defence, “Dstl Demonstrates Satellite Operation Capability,” GOV.UK, November 18, 2020. ↩︎
  28. Ministry of Defence, “Designing Defence’s Next Generation Multi-Satellite System,” GOV.UK, October 23, 2024. ↩︎
  29. BBC News, “UK’s Strategic Defence Review: Key Insights and Implications,” BBC News, August 16, 2024. ↩︎
  30. NASA Earthdata, “SAR: Earth Observation Data Basics,” NASA
    Earthdata, undated. ↩︎
  31. Specim, “What is Hyperspectral Imaging?,” Specim, undated. ↩︎
  32. Intelligence Online, “Hyperspectral: The New Frontier of Geospatial Intelligence Part 1: Washington Looks for Ways to Beat Beijing,” Intelligence Online, September 20, 2024. ↩︎
  33. Defense News, “France Approves Final Phase of Artemis Big Data Processing Platform,” Defense News, July 11, 2022. ↩︎
  34. The Times, “Jet Pioneer Frank Whittle Had a Blitz Beater in 1938,” The Times, January 4, 2021. ↩︎
  35. Daily Mail, “The Blueprint of the Jet Age: Secret Archive Chief Engineer Worked on Development of Revolutionary Fighter Plane Engine,” Daily Mail, March 11, 2014. ↩︎
  36. Google Arts & Culture, “Skylark: Britain’s Pioneering Space Rocket Science,” Google Arts & Culture, undated. ↩︎