Israeli soldiers during the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Credit: Israel Defence Forces
European nations face new security threats that are prompting them to look beyond the continent to defend themselves, including to Israel and other countries in the Middle East. NATO should develop a new category for nations such as Israel that are integral to the defense of its members, and for whom NATO’s support commitments could be transformative in their fight to survive.
On a late summer day, August 17, 2023, the United States approved Israel’s sale of its Arrow-3 missile defense system to Germany. It was reportedly the largest foreign military sale in Israel’s history, clocking in at over $3.5 billion. The symbolism of the deal—Germany looking to Israel to protect its skies—was not lost on either side. “Seventy-five years ago, the Jewish People had been ground into ash on the soil of Nazi Germany,” read a statement from Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “Seventy-five years later, the state of the Jews is giving Germany, a different Germany, the tools to defend itself.”1
Germany’s Ambassador to Israel, Steffen Seibert, said of the purchase, “It is highly valuable for both sides—of great material value for Israel, and of a symbolic value for both of us because for many years the military relationship with Israel was more of a one-way street; us providing material to the Israelis.”2
The Arrow-3 purchase demonstrates European awareness of the need to look beyond the continent to defend itself. When in March 2022 it was first reported that Germany sought a missile defense system from another country in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz explained, “We need to be aware that we have a neighbor who is prepared to use violence to enforce their interests.”3
In other words, the Arrow-3 purchase was historic not only because it happened, but when it happened—as a European nation began to contemplate its defense in existential terms as the continent faced the largest land war since World War II. While the Arrow-3 was far from Israel’s first foreign military sale, it was the first and most significant for a war taking place outside of the Middle East. It took a conventional war to shake the cobwebs from the bureaucratic U.S. and European defense industrial bases, which had not needed to innovate and scale production with such speed and urgency in decades.
Israel as Military Hardware Supplier
Over two years since Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO members continue to seek ways of adapting and modernizing their defenses, with Israel playing a key role. Indeed, just one day after its admission into NATO in April 2023, Finland sought the David’s Sling air defense system. Executives at Rafael, the Israeli company behind David’s Sling, have expressed confidence that other European nations will seek to acquire the David’s Sling system in light of Russia’s campaign targeting cities across Ukraine—the very kind of attack for which Israel developed the system.4
Since the start of Russia’s invasion, demand for Israeli weapons systems has increased throughout Europe: Poland and Greece have sought Israeli Spike anti-tank missiles,5 Romania has sought Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system,6 and Estonia has sought Israeli loitering munitions.7 In September 2023, Israeli company Elbit Systems agreed to produce the EuroPULS rocket artillery kit for Germany, potentially as a replacement for the MARS 2 system Germany has been sending to Ukraine.8 In fact, Israel’s drone sales increased forty percent since 2020, and had its “second record-breaking year in a row for defense exports” in 2022, when it generated close to $13 billion in revenue.9
The urgency of war that Israel’s military has faced throughout its existence, and which has been awakened in Europe since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, suggests a new chapter in Israel’s history as an indispensable force multiplier for European defense needs.
There is then an urgent need today to consider ways of building upon Israel’s recent record as a defense contributor to its neighbors in Europe and beyond—namely how to leverage Israel’s comparative technological advantages, which were born out of its own survival instincts amid a reality of war. The timing is especially important in the American context. Not only do few other U.S. allies compare to Israel when it comes to the quality of its innovative edge—as European and other allies’ interest in Israel’s technology demonstrates—but few other nations rival Israel in the range of critique of continued U.S. assistance from voices in both political parties.10
It should be noted that Israel’s innovative output would not be possible without consistent U.S. assistance over recent decades. Viewed from the perspective of the threats posed by the United States’ top adversaries as well as the contributions made by Israel, it is clear any threat to assistance to Israel puts Americans and our allies directly in harm’s way.
An Allied Defense Industrial Base
Although the United States has not felt the war in Ukraine in the same way as NATO’s easternmost members, all nations involved in military assistance to Ukraine have come to the same realization: the defense industrial base of the United States would require significant improvements in production speed and agility to be practical for a war that would directly involve NATO. The extent to which U.S. shipbuilding lags behind China’s fast-developing naval fleet, which today is the largest in the world, has been well documented.11 Other aspects of the vulnerabilities of the U.S. defense industrial base have come to light—including isolating the manufacture of the explosive material in gunpowder to a single factory in Louisiana,12 the revelation within various government oversight reports of challenges in fielding directed-energy weaponry13 and significant lags in the acquisition process,14 among other topics.
Although these revelations have invited new conversations about the need to reform the U.S. defense acquisition process—specifically with the aim of fielding a greater range of innovative technologies—this reform would incur a great deal of risk and time by Congress, the White House, and industry leaders. Further, the processes needed to transition to a new acquisition approach would likely face a great deal of uncertainty, which is untenable in today’s threat landscape and persistent risks of military escalation around the world.
Across the Atlantic, momentum has been building much faster to revamp defense production. NATO’s July 2023 Vilnius Summit committed to a Defense Production Action Plan that would underscore NATO’s role “as a convener, standard-setter, requirement setter and aggregator, and delivery enabler to promote sustainable defense industrial capacity.”15
Implementing the plan will undoubtedly face its own challenges, especially given the intense competition amongst NATO members over where different capabilities should be produced and which capabilities should be purchased from abroad.16 The opportunities for NATO members to co-produce and co-fund military ventures—especially those originating from Israeli innovation—would appear to be a far less contentious proposition.
Given recent NATO-Israel engagements focused on technological exchanges, an integration of Israel’s defense production into the transatlantic defense industrial base would be a natural next step. Such a move would invite new considerations: challenges of scaling production, reactions of allies in the region to Israel’s involvement in NATO,17 and—perhaps the key strategic priority—protections against the most sensitive technology getting into China’s hands.
Many of these considerations can be addressed through existing frameworks, leveraging the historic Abraham Accords and the recent budding advances in military cooperation among signatory nations. This coordination would provide a natural pathway for allies already working in tandem to continue those partnerships in the NATO setting. Furthermore, greater engagement by both the United States and NATO would likely include greater scrutiny and consultation with allies to block China’s influence, which may have the ancillary effect of bringing the United States and NATO in closer alignment on China.
A Transregional Strategic Landscape
It is fair to observe that few adversaries restrict themselves to imposing their destructive agenda on a single region. Iran’s provision of drones and ammunition to aid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while attacking U.S. troops in the Middle East, is an example. In much the same way, our allies understand that working together with like-minded partners, regardless of location, is the only way to preserve peace at a time when the international order is at its most fragile since the end of World War II.
The United States ought to consider enhancing Israel’s “major non-NATO ally status” considering the need for greater cooperation between the United States, Israel, and NATO.18 It is time for NATO to develop a new category for nations that are not only integral to the defense of NATO members, but for whom NATO’s commitments of support could be transformative in their fight to survive. This arrangement must include a clear arrangement for interoperability between Israeli and NATO technology, as evidenced by the lessons of the U.S. Marines’ purchase of Israel’s Iron Dome and gaps in its adaptation.19
Israel today faces the greatest threat to its existence and while it is capable of fighting for itself—even if at a high cost—it needs its European allies, especially diplomatically and—if Iran escalates—militarily as well.
References
1 Benjamin Netanyahu, “Statement by PM Netanyahu.” Office of the Prime Minister, August 17, 2023.
2 Ruth Marks Eglash, “With polished Hebrew, Germany’s ambassador to Israel draws inspiration from the job.” Jewish Insider, August, 29, 2023.
3 Sabine Siebold, Emma Thomasson, and Dan Williams, “Germany eyes buying missile defence system, Chancellor Scholz says.” Reuters, March 27, 2022.
4 Jake Epstein, “NATO’s newest member is now becoming the first country to buy an advanced Israeli air-defense system.” Business Insider, April 7, 2023.
5 Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, “Poland to make hundreds of Israeli-designed Spike antitank missiles.” Defense News, August 7, 2023; Chris Martin, “Greece buys Rafael’s anti-tank Spike missiles from Israel.” Defense News, April 10, 2023.
6 Madalin Necsutu, “Romania Eyes Israel’s Iron Dome Missile Defence System.” Balkan Insight, September 22, 2022.
7 Rojoef Manuel, “Estonia Taps Israel Aerospace Industries to Supply Loitering Munitions.” The Defense Post, May 5, 2023.
8 Vivienne Machi and Elisabeth Gosselin-Malo, “KNDS, Israel’s Elbit to produce European rocket artillery kit.” Defense News, September 14, 2023.
9 Adam Lucente, “Israel’s defense exports on the rise, drone customers up 40% since 2020.” Al-Monitor, October 2, 2023.
10 See for example Jacob Olidort, “How Israel Became a Global Key to Deterrence.” 19FortyFive, September 5, 2023.
11 See for example Alexander Wooley, “Float, Move, and Fight: How the U.S. Navy Lost the Shipbuilding Race.” Foreign Policy, October 21, 2021.
12 Gordon Lubold, “The U.S. Military Relies on One Louisiana Factory. It Blew Up.” Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2023.
13 “Directed Energy Weapons: DOD Should Focus on Transition Planning.” U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO-23-105868), April 17, 2023.
14 “Weapon Systems Annual Assessment: Programs Are Not Consistently Implementing Practices That Can Help Accelerate Acquisitions.” U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO-23-106059), June 8, 2023.
15 “Vilnius Summit Communiqué: Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius 11 July 2023.” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, July 11, 2023; Vivienne Machi, “NATO prepares industry plan to boost arms production.” DefenseNews, September 11, 2023.
16 Laura Kayali, “France and Germany clash (again) on buying U.S. arms.” Politico, September 20, 2023.
17 The United Arab Emirates would be another natural defense partner as well, especially in light of recent joint ventures with partners outside of the region. See for example Agnes Helou, “As UAE firms expand global reach, Brazil takes center stage for EDGE Group.” BreakingDefense, September 28, 2023.
18 Thomas Trask and Jacob Olidort, “The Case for Upgrading Israel’s ‘Major Non-NATO Ally’ Status.” RealClearDefense, November 6, 2023.
19 Sam Mundy and Ari Cicurel, “U.S. Marines’ foray with Iron Dome highlights criticality of integration between U.S., Israeli Tech.” BreakingDefense, February 24, 2023.