For all the United States has done to deter Chinese aggression, it has neglected to convince one key group: the American people. The White House should leverage the bipartisan consensus for support of Taiwan in Congress and work to educate the public on the importance of cross-strait deterrence.
If the United States wants to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait, its deterrence policy is missing one key ingredient: the American public. For all the Biden administration’s impressive foreign policy successes in the Indo-Pacific—from reinforcing the Quad, new bases in the Philippines, and reinforced trilateral coordination with Japan and South Korea—the administration has still failed to bring along the American people on its mission to deter Chinese aggression.
For instance, no State Department official above the assistant secretary level1 has focused a speech on Taiwan since the United States terminated official relations with Taipei in 1979. A recent poll shows only ~40% of Americans support sending troops to aid Taiwan in the event of a Chinese intervention,2 20% lower than the height of U.S. public support for the Vietnam War.3 For deterrence to succeed, China must perceive that the United States is capable and credible in its commitment to a peaceful cross-Strait status quo.
Yet, with increasing uncertainty over strategic ambiguity and what are set to be historic elections in both the United States and Taiwan, the Biden administration must act now to convince the American public why it is in their direct interests that cross-Strait deterrence does not fail.
Contextualizing U.S. Public Support and Deterrence
In the long run, U.S. military deterrence is only as credible as the public’s willingness to support it. And to avoid war, China must perceive that America is capable and willing to respond to deny Beijing its strategic goals or impose unacceptably high costs. Militarily, many sources place the United States and its allies only slightly ahead of China, but the American deterrence toolkit is much more than its military.
From economic sanctions to cyber to diplomatic pressures (including fast-tracking arm sales to Taiwan), the United States and its regional allies have a plethora of sub-military options. The U.S. public (65-76%) largely supports these non-military options, however, support drops significantly to 40%4 for sending troops to defend Taiwan against China (having fallen 12% from the year before)5—which President Biden has stated the United States would do. This matters because non-military options are likely insufficient to deter Beijing in the long run.
For credible deterrence, it is critical not to confuse the American bi-partisan consensus on China as a threat with willingness to support Taiwan. And though historically, a “rally around the flag” effect often increases support in the face of a crisis, this faces two key issues regarding Taiwan. First, this will mean deterrence is failing, since some crisis will have to exist in the Taiwan Strait for there to be a rallying effect. Second, skepticism of U.S. public support for foreign interventions is warranted, post-Iraq and Afghanistan, especially from a growing number of Republicans and independents. Some of this war weariness is already visible, with sliding support for the war in Ukraine, and difficulty passing military aid to U.S. partners in the Middle East. With China only increasing its regional military capabilities and with a historic election that could bring Trumpian politics back to the White House, do we feel confident that Xi Jinping will respect the status quo?
Bringing the American Public Along
The Biden administration should make three arguments articulating why Taiwan matters to Americans’ pocketbooks, the safety of their families, and their values.
First, to borrow a great Carvillean phrase, “It’s the economy, stupid.” The economic and inflationary pressures from the war in Ukraine or the COVID-19 lockdowns will look like chump change compared to even a moderate disruption in the Taiwan Strait. As William Langley, Chan Ho-him, and Thomas Hale reported in the Financial Times, “half of the global container fleet and 88% of the world’s largest ships by tonnage passed through the Strait [in 2022.]”6 A loss of $2 trillion of economic activity is the conservative estimate from only a blockage scenario—without taking secondary or tertiary effects into account, which some put closer to $3 trillion.7
From the pump to the pantry, Americans would likely suffer from far worse inflation than anything they have experienced to date. Additionally, such inflationary pressures would be only complicated by Taiwan’s dominant position in the global semiconductor market (accounting for approximately 60% of its share and producing over 90% of the most advanced chips according to The Economist).8 If Americans found the supply disruptions during the pandemic bad, the downfall of Taiwan’s chip industry would mean a technology winter—making everything from phones, cars, medical equipment, AI systems, and even crucial military equipment completely unaffordable if not temporarily non-existent. Not to mention that reversing any disruption would be costly, with estimates of $300 billion over three years to replace Taiwan’s chip capacity.9
Second, the Biden administration should explain that credible deterrence capacity is the least costly option to secure Americans and their families against the increasing risk of nuclear weapons use. The stakes for deterrence are incredibly high. A failure of deterrence would mark the first time since the Cold War that there is a risk of even limited nuclear weapons use in a local theater (e.g. use of a nuclear EMP), due to a direct conflict between the United States and another great power. With China expanding its nuclear arsenal, a U.S. failure to protect Taiwan would make it harder to enforce its security commitments to Japan and South Korea in the first island chain and put pressure on non-proliferation norms.
For example, Japanese politicians have long debated the country’s relationship to nuclear weapons and Japan maintains a low nuclear breakout threshold with its “bomb in the basement” hedge.10 A perceived absence of support from the United States over Taiwan would only incentivize our regional allies (including South Korea) to have high-stakes debates on nuclearization, adding dangerous complexity to a region that already struggles with rogue actors and nuclear brinksmanship.
The costs of deterrence are low relative to the other options. Americans should know that deterrence does not currently require any “boots on the ground” in Taiwan or fighting a long-term counter-insurgency conflict (a.k.a. a “forever war”). This is partly because deterrence against China’s conventional military exploits an idiosyncratic weakness—its inexperience. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has never fought an all-domain war—and the last time it fought at all was against Vietnam in the 1970s. China’s own state press has referred to its lack of first-hand combat experience as a “peace disease.”11 Even Russia had more battleground experience than China from Syria, Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine—and the PLA is likely watching Russia’s failure in Ukraine with concern.
Simultaneous to rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, China is also undergoing its weakest economic growth in four decades compounded by a trajectory of stark demographic decline, prompting some to question if its economic power has peaked. Though any failed attempt at reunification would likely irreparably weaken the party’s legitimacy, Chinese public support for armed reunification is still around 55%12—forcing the United States to consider whether a shifting set of international and domestic factors could cause a “now or never” moment in the near future for Xi Jinping regarding his goal of reunification. Meaning, that U.S. public support for deterrence is all the more critical and made more credible if executed carefully in the face of these particular Chinese shortcomings.
While Taiwan is a vibrant democracy, Chinese interference persisted in Taiwan’s most recent national elections, sowing doubt13 about the United States through disinformation and undermining candidates with U.S.-friendly stances. The American public needs to understand that around 90%14 of Taiwanese do not want unification with the mainland. This sentiment was reaffirmed by early 2024 election results, where the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), known for its inclination to distance itself from China, secured a third term—an unprecedented occurrence in Taiwan’s democratic history.
Beijing’s Bold Ambitions
The absence of U.S. backing would provide a conducive environment for Chinese disinformation aimed at cultivating skepticism toward the United States in Taiwan. While Taiwan undoubtedly showcases the viability of Chinese democracy, which continues to perturb Beijing, its core attributes of openness and democratic essence have paradoxically become vulnerabilities exploited by China.
After Hong Kong’s downfall, Beijing seems to be emboldened to undermine democracies in the Indo-Pacific over which it harbors ambitions, and has unabashedly asserted its increasing geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific region. A notable instance was Beijing’s successful poaching of the Republic of Nauru following the DPP victory on January 13, 2024, leading to the severance of Nauru’s ties with Taiwan on January 15, 2024 and thereby extending China’s sway in the area. In this sense, demonstrating deterrence is of utmost importance to preserve Taiwan’s freedom and establish boundaries on China’s expansion of authoritarian influence—both in the Indo-Pacific and around the globe.
The Biden administration can and should buttress U.S. deterrence credibility with the clear-eyed support of the American public. The White House should leverage the bipartisan consensus for support of Taiwan in Congress, and work with like-minded leaders across the aisle to jointly educate the American people on the importance of cross-strait deterrence. Throughout 2024, China’s leadership will be watching the elections in both United States and Taiwan for signs of uncertainty. America need not give them one.
References
1 “The U.S. Must Do More to Deter China and Support Taiwan, Urges New CFR Task Force Report.” Council on Foreign Relations, June 20, 2023.
2 Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, “Americans Favor Aiding Taiwan Against China.” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 11, 2022.
3 Frank Newport and Joseph Carroll, “Iraq Versus Vietnam: A Comparison of Public Opinion.” Gallup, August 24, 2005.
4 Smeltz and Kafura, “Americans Favor Aiding Taiwan Against China.” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 11, 2022.
5 Smeltz and Kafura. “For First Time, Half of Americans Favor Defending Taiwan If China Invades.” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 26, 2021.
6 Thomas Hale, William Langley, and Chan Ho-him. “How rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait could threaten global trade.” Financial Times, August 4, 2022.
7 Charlie Vest, Agatha Kratz, and Reva Goujon, “The Global Economic Disruptions from a Taiwan Conflict.” Rhodium Group, December 14, 2022; Mark Magnier, “Sanctioning China over a Taiwan War Would Exact US$3 Trillion Toll: Report.” South China Morning Post, June 22, 2023.
8 “Taiwan’s Dominance of the Chip Industry Makes It More Important.” The Economist. March 6, 2023.
9 Shelby Holliday, “What’s at Stake If China Invades Taiwan.” The Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2022.
10 Robert Windrem, “Japan Has ‘Nuclear Bomb in the Basement,’ and China Isn’t Happy.” NBCNews.com, March 11, 2014; Richard J. Samuels and James L. Schoff, “Japan’s Nuclear Hedge: Beyond ‘Allergy’ and Breakout.” Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 3 (2015): 475–503.
11 Minnie Chan, “China’s army ‘infiltrated by peace disease’ after years without a war, says its official newspaper.” South China Morning Post, July 3, 2018.
12 Xiaojun Li, “Assessing Public Support for (Non-)Peaceful Unification with Taiwan.” The Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program, May 15, 2023.
13 Tessa Wong, “Taiwan election: China sows doubt about U.S. with disinformation.” BBC News, January 7, 2024.
14 “Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland (1994/12~2023/12).” Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, February 22, 2024.