A common narrative in Europe persists that the United Kingdom’s geopolitical status has been weakened after Brexit. Similar views exist in the United States, where the argument has been made that Britain has recently become too liberal, too “woke,” to play its traditional role as America’s foremost ally.  

These narratives overlook the realities of British policy and capabilities over the past half-decade. In reality, London’s importance as a regional and global security actor has increased in the last five to six years. As the terms of the trans-Atlantic relationship are renegotiated, the UK is likely to play an integral role both in Europe and beyond.  

The greatest factor in this success has been the UK government’s ability to act nimbly and decisively in diplomatic and military spheres, unencumbered by the ponderous policymaking processes that can slow strategic decision-making on the Continent. This strategic agility has provided London with outsized leverage in the fluid geopolitics of the past few years. 

The UK’s strategic successes will become all the more important as Europe’s geopolitics grow more precarious. The United States is justly demanding European countries take a significantly greater stake in their own defence as Washington confronts China and seeks to manage crises in the Middle East. However and whenever Russia’s war against Ukraine ends, its direct probes against European territory indicate Moscow is a direct, enduring threat to European security. And underlying and overlaying it all is China’s increasing hostility and assertiveness in every sphere. 

In this context, Europe should learn from London’s strategic successes since Brexit. European capitals should not allow domestic political animus over the Brexit process to obscure the deeper strategic reality that the European Union’s labyrinthine bureaucracy is not fit to confront a dynamic crisis. European countries must instead move independently, with vigor and initiative, to secure their interests and strengthen the West.  

British Strategic Success in the 2020s 

The UK is more central to European security and the broader western alliance than it has been in decades. Since the 2021 Integrated Review (the UK’s national security strategy document), the UK has steadily toughened its position on China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The 2023 Integrated Review Refresh strengthened this focus.¹ Moreover, the current Labour Government – notwithstanding major missteps on Chagos and the China spying case – has generally pursued a policy in continuity with its Conservative predecessor. Defence spending is rising, while the UK remains a leading supporter of Ukraine.²

Of course, challenges persist. British hedging has weakened its position in the Middle East, as the current Government aligned itself with a largely feckless European position on Iran and Gaza. This has reduced Anglo-American cooperation and placed strain on the Five Eyes Intelligence alliance. Defence spending has not risen as rapidly as it might have. Broader economic stagnation remains a strategic problem.  

Nonetheless, the UK has shown verve and achieved several important successes over the past few years. No country has been more willing to wear risk in support of Ukraine, both before and following Russia’s invasion, sending lethal aid and long-range capabilities before anyone else.³ No country has engaged more closely with the United States – both the Biden and Trump Administrations – to secure global sea lanes and use kinetic military action against the Houthis in Yemen.⁴ No country has more quickly recognized the threat from China, aligning with Washington’s positions on inward investments and export controls.⁵ Enormously consequential, the UK has increased investment in its nuclear enterprise, for the first time, moving beyond continuous at-sea deterrent.⁶ 

It is not for nothing that the U.S. Defense Secretary urged the UK to lead Europe in planning for reduced American military protection.⁷ London remains the linchpin.

Europe’s Strategic Challenge

European governments are struggling to bring a new social and international contract into being. Germany’s current coalition remains fragile, navigating an unexpected economic transition and trying to execute a military buildup on a narrow industrial base that cannot absorb enormous influxes of capital easily.⁸ France is locked in a cycle of governmental instability and disruption, eroding Paris’s ability to act strategically.⁹ Geopolitical fault lines are reappearing within Europe as well, as a divergence opens up between the Eastern European powers threatened by Russia and those Western European countries — particularly Spain and Portugal — that seek to maintain their social welfare states.¹⁰

Most concerning, the foundational pillar of the post-war project, the American security guarantee, is shrouded in ambiguity. Without it, Europe is unsure of how to respond to hard power scenarios even in its neighbourhood. Abroad, it has been made irrelevant in the Middle East, as the United States sets geopolitical terms absent European support. This reflects President Donald Trump’s stated intention to become an international peacemaker. He may yet be successful, but Europe has yet to demonstrate it can pay its fair share of any security burden. 

Nimbleness in Strategic Decision-Making 

Europe can meet the moment by learning from the UK’s recent strategic success and recognizing a crucial fact: the UK’s separation from the rigid, cautious, consensus-driven machinery of the EU has allowed it to act with decision and alacrity during crisis. Brexit has made the UK a more valuable partner for both the United States and Europe, allowing it to punch above its conventional diplomatic weight. 

While many critics focused on the economic implications of Brexit, few grasped the geopolitical agility it facilitated. Since 2021, the UK has been able to act with speed and decisiveness, unencumbered by the need to broker consensus across 27 member states or to consider constraining institutional frameworks. Perhaps the UK’s exit from the European Union reminded the British public and policy class of the value of moving first and quickly. The UK is, in some respects, behind institutionally, but open debate has at least begun in British circles.¹¹

The best example of the UK’s newfound agility in strategic decisionmaking has been London’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The UK’s strategic posture toward Russia was built on years of clear-eyed, state-centric analysis, stretching back to the 2014 annexation of Crimea. British policymakers had a moment of sharp awakening by the act of terrorism Russia executed on British soil in 2018 in Salisbury. From 2021 onwards, the entire British foreign policy apparatus was extraordinarily forward-leaning in response to Russian aggression. The intelligence community, the military, and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) worked seamlessly with the United States to deliver granular, actionable warnings of the full-scale invasion far in advance of Continental partners.¹²

Critically, when the invasion became inevitable, the UK acted as the crucial first-mover on both lethal aid and strategic signaling. It was the first major European nation to commit vital military equipment, most notably the NLAW anti-tank missile systems, which proved tactically decisive in the early defence of Kyiv.¹³ The speed of this action was a direct consequence of sovereign control over foreign, defence, and sanctions policy, a strength that stemmed from policy laid before 2022 in the 2021 Integrated Review.¹⁴

This leadership continued after the invasion. The UK was the first Western power to break the implicit aid barriers, delivering Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks, which deliberately created the political and moral space for the US and Germany to subsequently commit Abrams and Leopard tanks.¹⁵ Indeed, it is not clear whether Berlin or Washington would have taken a step that was deemed so strategically and politically aggressive without British leadership. 

Beyond hardware, London played a critical role in the shadow war against Russia. The UK has aggressively integrated its targeting network with Ukrainian forces.¹⁶ Furthermore, the UK has fortified the evolving alliance structure, providing early, robust security guarantees and training capacity to frontline states like Poland, and facilitating the seamless transition of Finland and Sweden toward full NATO membership.¹⁷ Had Russian adventurism gotten Putin past Ukraine, British soldiers, aircraft, warships, and nuclear capabilities would have been the critical first line of defence against Moscow’s predation. The UK’s decisiveness and risk appetite has been an indispensable counterweight to the often slower, bureaucratic decision-making processes that still plague much of Europe, while also galvanising other partners to seize strategic opportunities. 

British vigor in strategic decision-making has also allowed rapid institutional reform. A key move has been the creation of a real, centralized operational Headquarters (Northwood HQ and the Joint Maritime Security Centre) for war-fighting purposes, uniting a fragmented command structure. This ensures UK forces are genuinely prepared for high-intensity, peer-on-peer conflict. Furthermore, the establishment of the National Armaments Director (NAD) post is a critical industrial reform. The NAD is empowered to streamline procurement, ensure industrial capacity, and guarantee that the UK armed forces can logistically and substantively meet their commitments.

The critical lesson that the Europe should learn from these successes is that unilateral, national-level strategic decision-making can be far more effective than waiting for continent-wide consensus. Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, and other national governments should take the initiative when possible to advance their nations’ strategic positions and strengthen the Western alliance. In the fast-changing geopolitics of the 21^st century, Europe cannot afford to wait for consensus before acting.  

New Frontiers

London’s post-Brexit strategic agility has also proven valuable in helping the nation embrace new strategic technologies and forge valuable alliances both within Europe and outside the continent.  

The focus on the comparative British strength of advanced technologies has been a major factor in the UK’s strategic success in the past few years. The development of the Dragonfire Laser Directed Energy Weapon (LDEW), a counter-Unmanned Aerial System (CUAS) designed to shoot down drones and missiles at a fraction of the cost of conventional interceptors, showcases an institutional pivot towards asymmetric advantage, as considered under the UK MOD’s SONAC.¹⁸ This has been complemented by investment in other anti-drone systems and emerging warfighting technologies. This focus on high-technology and integration is the reason why the UK military remains at the premier level of interoperability with American forces, a strategic asset that provides London, at least in principle, with outsized influence in Washington’s policy circles compared to its relative capabilities.¹⁹

In addition, the UK’s strategic edge is defined by its willingness to operate effectively in the unseen dimensions of conflict: intelligence and cyberspace operations. Reports of UK Special Forces in Ukraine have signaled a deep, on-the-ground commitment, supporting everything from logistics to specialised reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering missions. This Special Operations expertise is paired with the extraordinary capabilities of Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). 

In the cyber realm, GCHQ has been operating aggressively. On the defensive side, it has worked closely with Ukrainian security services to bolster critical infrastructure. More aggressively, UK cyber capabilities have been leveraged for offensive intelligence operations against Russian military and state interests, including targeting their command-and-control networks, supply chain logistics, and disinformation campaigns. This level of aggressive integration of intelligence, cyber, and Special Operations assets places the UK at the cutting edge of modern hybrid warfare, demonstrating a willingness to take calibrated, high-impact risks that many European allies, constrained by domestic political sensitivities, have avoided. 

British grand strategy and international interests have impacted not just the immediate European periphery, but also the world’s center of geopolitical gravity: the Indo-Pacific.²⁰ The UK has successfully leveraged its history, intelligence partnerships, and defence industrial base to become the essential strategic bridge between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific.

The AUKUS security pact, linking together Canberra, Washington and London, is the clearest manifestation of this bridging strategy. It is more than a nuclear submarine deal; it is the spearhead for a truly integrated, high-tech defence industrial ecosystem that extends across the globe, with more political moves contemplated.²¹ The transformative value resides in AUKUS Pillar II, which focuses on collaborative development of advanced capabilities such as AI, quantum technologies, cyber, electronic warfare, and hypersonic weapons. This effort is creating a shared technology baseline that will undergird the strategic advantage of all three partners in Asia for decades. This foundational strategic advantage, which aims to deter aggression in the vital Indo-Pacific theater, would have been politically unthinkable and technically unachievable without the UK’s drive, technical expertise, and geopolitical convening power. 

Simultaneously, the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) solidifies the UK’s role as the primary security provider for Northern Europe. The JEF is a UK-led, high-readiness force comprising ten partner nations: the UK, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. It is designed to be agile, rapidly deployable, and capable of operating in the “High North” and North Atlantic- areas of critical strategic competition with Russia. It serves as a rapid, flexible, and politically unencumbered complement to NATO, actively conducting deterrence operations, securing vital energy infrastructure, and facilitating defence coordination for Northern European partners. In time, the JEF may serve as the backstop for Ukrainian security guarantees, given its liminal character between NATO, the EU, and other nations. Indeed, the interoperability that the JEF built with new NATO members Sweden and Finland helped ensure their rapid integration into NATO after accession. 

Fast New World

In a fracturing West, where the old European model has collapsed and continental coherence is elusive, the UK, despite its internal political turbulence, has proven to be an unconventional and indispensable anchor. Its willingness to act unilaterally, its deep technical integration with the US, and its clear-eyed, long-term commitment to a linked Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security strategy has allowed it to define the strategic landscape for its allies, acting as the nimble, decisive force multiplier the West desperately requires.  

Adapting to a new world requires the European powers to embrace an aggressive, risk-taking mindset, one that is a radical break from the slow-moving Brussels bureaucracy, or the domestic bureaucracies that define most European states. Europe must embrace geopolitical opportunities to shape the environment around them, rather than obsessing over total consensus or analytical frameworks. They should learn from the UK’s experience in this respect over the past five years. 

1. “Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world,” Her Majesty’s Government, March 2023. ↩︎
2. “Citing Russia threat, U.K. leader announces military spending boost, including new nuclear-powered submarines,” CBS News, June 2, 2025. ↩︎
3. Peter Dickinson, “Britain becomes first country to supply Ukraine with long-range missiles,” The Atlantic Council, May 11, 2023. ↩︎
4. Stephen Castle, “Britain Joins U.S. in Strike Against Houthis in Yemen,” New York Times, April 30, 2025. ↩︎
5. “UK Expands Export Controls to Semiconductor and Other Emerging Technologies,” Morrison Foerster Client Alert, March 14, 2024. ↩︎
6. Claire Mills, “Replacing the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent: Progress of the Dreadnought Class,” House of Commons Library Research Briefing, Briefing Paper no. CBP-8010, August 5, 2025. ↩︎
7. “Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Greets the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defence John Healey and Takes Questions From the Press,” U.S. Department of War, March 6, 2025. ↩︎
8. Nette Nostlinger and Chris Lunday, “Merz’s fragile coalition buckles under pressure to reform Germany,” Politico, October 31, 2025. ↩︎
9. Steven Erlanger, “France’s Domestic Instability Has Weakened Its Diplomatic Clout,” New York Times, October 10, 2025. ↩︎
10. Anna Grzymala-Busse, “An East-West Split in the EU?,” Current History 115, no. 779 (2016): 89-94. ↩︎
11. Lord Verdirame KC, Dr. Tom Grant, Air Marshal (Ret) Edward Stringer CB CBE, et al, “The Ottawa Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions: Can We Still Afford Them?,” Policy Exchange, March 24, 2025.  ↩︎
12. Dan Lomas, “Ukraine and Intelligence Prebuttal: A Quick Post-Mortem,” RUSI, February 24, 2022. ↩︎
13. Sebastien Roblin, “The NLAW Missiles The U.K. Rushed To Ukraine May Only Be Useful In Desperate Circumstances,” Forbes, January 25, 2022; Dan Sabbagh and Isobel Koshiw, “The battle for Kyiv revisited: the litany of mistakes that cost Russia a quick win,” The Guardian, December 28, 2022. ↩︎
14. Air Marshal (Ret) Edward Stringer, “Affording the Integrated Review,” Policy Exchange, October 28, 2022.  ↩︎
15. Bernd Debusmann Jr, George Wright, and Antoinette Radford, “Germany confirms it will provide Ukraine with Leopard 2 tanks,” BBC, January 25, 2023; Michael Savage, “Sunak confirms UK will send tanks to Ukraine ‘to push Russian troops back,’” The Guardian, January 14, 2023. ↩︎
16. Dan Sabbagh and Luke Harding, “UK to continue to supply intelligence to Ukraine after US cutoff,”, The Guardian, March 6, 2025; Christopher Miller and James Politi, “US to provide intel to guide Ukrainian long-range missile attacks on Russia,” Financial Times, October 2, 2025.  ↩︎
17. Przemysław Biskup, Alexander Lanoszka, Maria Piechowska, et al, “The trilateral initiative: How Britain, Poland and Ukraine can shape a post-war Europe,” Council on Geostrategy, April 29, 2024; “UK agrees mutual security deals with Finland and Sweden,” BBC, May 11, 2022. ↩︎
18. Gabriel Elefteriu, “A Question of Power,” Policy Exchange, November 28, 2018. ↩︎
19. “Special Relationships? US, UK and NATO: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report,” House of Commons, Report no. HC 184, June 13, 2022; Max Bergmann and Lexi Linafelter, “Making the U.S.-UK Special Relationship Fit for Purpose,” CSIS, July 15, 2025. ↩︎
20. Sir John Jenkins KCMG LVO, Air Marshal (Ret) Edward Stringer CB CBE, Harry Halem, et al, “The Iran Question and British Strategy,” Policy Exchange, July 17, 2023; Jay Mens, Marcus Solarz Hendricks, Harry Halem, et al, “Crisis and Opportunity in the Middle East,” Policy Exchange, January 13, 2025. ↩︎
21. “A Very British Tilt,” Policy Exchange, November 22, 2020.  ↩︎