An 18th-century example of transatlantic cooperation: General Jean-Baptiste de Vimeur, Comte de Rochambeau, leads the French Expeditionary Force in their crucial support of the American Revolution. Credit: Library of Congress.
A mix of appeasement, disunity, and economic dependence undermined Western support for Ukraine in the years leading up to Russia’s 2022 invasion. The same cocktail will fail against Beijing today.
“Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow” were words that resonated around the world in 2022. The similarities are palpable. Like Ukraine, Taiwan is threatened by a malign authoritarian neighbor. Like Ukraine, its neighbor uses a warped historical narrative to discredit its democratic government. And most importantly, like Ukraine, the autocrat running its large neighbor has made no secret of his violent intentions.
Three years into the Ukraine conflict, we have learned three major lessons for protecting Taiwan: the value of unrestricted deterrence, the importance of economic policy, and the need for trans-Atlantic unity.
Avoid Self-Imposed Limits on Escalation
One lesson from the Ukraine conflict is that complacency, appeasement and setting out pre-determined limits on our response to aggressive acts only embolden dictators. With Ukraine, a pattern emerged of Western powers preemptively ruling out certain types of support for fear of escalation, often then U-turning a few weeks later. We saw this pattern with HIMARS, Leopard tanks, and even fighter aircraft.1 The best way to avoid Taiwan following Ukraine’s path is to lay out a clear and unequivocal deterrence, refusing to self-impose limits to the economic, diplomatic and even military costs we could levy on China. In such a case, European countries should be willing to supply arms to Taiwan in cooperation with the U.S. and Japan.
A Chinese assault on Taiwan is likely to follow a playbook similar to that deployed by Russia’s Vladimir Putin in Ukraine. It may start with a naval quarantine or the capture of one of Taiwan’s smaller islands, in the same vein as Putin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. These acts will be condemned and sanctions will be applied, but the threshold for the U.S. to respond militarily is unlikely to be met. However, we should respond by ramping up sanctions, pushing Western companies to leave China, cutting off the lavish lifestyles of the families that support the CCP, increasing our diplomatic ties with Taiwan through high-profile visits, and strengthening Taiwan’s defense capabilities. Chinese President Xi Jinping will borrow from Putin’s playbook by threatening an escalation, but bowing to his threats will only embolden him further.
If smaller transgressions by China’s People’s Liberation Army are met with little more than statements of concern, Xi will at some point of his choosing seize the opportunity to launch a full invasion.
Escape Economic Dependence on Adversaries
Another lesson from the conflict in Ukraine is the power of economic leverage and independence as a deterrent.2 European business leaders justify Chinese strategic investment in Europe by protesting that their industries would not be relevant in geopolitical conflict.3 We heard similar protests a few years ago from business leaders and politicians regarding Russia’s cheap energy imports and Europe’s dependence on the Nord Stream pipelines, which turned out to be a weakness for European support for Ukraine.4 The European business community must apply this lesson to China.
This could take several forms. First, European business leaders with large footprints in China should make clear to Chinese leadership that any aggression—economic or military—against Taiwan will not be met with business as usual. This is a language that Beijing understands. Businesses should prepare their supply chains for an economic blockade or worse.
Another way to deter Chinese aggression in Taiwan is to increase economic relations, so the island is not primarily dependent on the Chinese market. The European Union can help facilitate this by moving forward on a bilateral investment agreement advancing trade with Taiwan.5
Some business leaders may argue that the threat of invasion should encourage divesting from Taiwan. This argument fails to account for the role of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry as the linchpin of the global digital economy. Taiwan produces 60 percent of the world’s semiconductors and 90 percent of the most advanced ones.6 We simply cannot insulate ourselves from the economic tsunami that would ensue from that supply being restricted.
Finally, China uses economic coercion as a weapon to force businesses and democratic states to bend to Beijing’s will or turn a blind eye to its human rights abuses. When states have raised concerns in recent years, their businesses have been subjected to Chinese tariffs and boycotts, from Australian winemakers to European and American fashion brands.7 The free world can blunt this economic weapon by creating an Economic Article Five similar to NATO’s Article Five: the principle would be that an economic attack on one democracy is seen as an attack on all. Like-minded states could show their solidarity in many forms, including extending credit lines and alternative markets to those affected.
Realize European-American Unity
The fall of Taiwan would end the United States’ dominance in the Indo-Pacific. There is no world where Washington could or should tolerate it. The ensuing conflict would, at worst, light the powder keg of global tensions and, at best, cause devastating economic consequences around the world.
The more isolationist part of the United States’ political leadership should consider that Europe requires U.S. backing on Ukraine just as the U.S. needs Europe’s backing on Taiwan. Europe is now the biggest donor to Ukraine’s war effort, but Kyiv will struggle to push back the Russian military machine without America’s military-industrial complex fully behind it.8
In exchange for U.S. support in Ukraine, Europe should shed our naivety towards Chinese ambitions and come off the geopolitical fence that has seen Europe develop deep economic ties and dependencies on China on one hand while relying on the security umbrella of the United States on the other. U.S. Senator Macro Rubio recently made this quid-pro-quo explicit, saying that if Europe does not “pick sides between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, then maybe we shouldn’t be picking sides” on Ukraine.9
We have already seen positive examples of European leaders standing up for Taiwan: Lithuania’s Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė and Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis have shown commendable courage in risking trade with China to support Taiwan.10 On the other hand, French President Emmanuel Macron demonstrated Europe’s inconsistencies when he failed to address Taiwan during his China visit in 2023, leaving concerns about Europe’s unified stance. He also suggested a conflict in Taiwan would not be Europe’s concern.11 Although Macron later clarified the comments, the damage was done and China renewed their military exercises around Taiwan shortly after the French visit.12
The ongoing war in Ukraine has demonstrated the strength of the democratic world when united. The greatest deterrence to China is for the free world to stand together against the rising autocracies. We have bent to their will for too long. Now China uses our meekness also as a weapon against Taiwan, coercing and threatening our politicians into ostracizing and isolating Taiwanese leaders. Collectively, we should make crystal clear to Beijing that although we follow the so-called ”One China Policy,” it is not a blank check for military aggression against Taiwan nor imposing any solution that is not accepted by the Taiwanese people. In no way does it preclude strengthening our ties with Taipei, nor does it mean we should exclude Taiwan from major international forums such as the UN World Health Assembly.
Over 80 years ago, the United States chose to isolate itself from a war in Europe. Soon it rfound the war was brought to them in the Pacific. American isolationism did not prevent war; it merely emboldened the autocrats and made the cost of containing them even greater. Similarly, European blindness to Chinese threats will only embolden autocrats in Beijing and Moscow.
We can see in Ukraine the costs of appeasement, economic dependency, and disunity. We can also see how powerful democratic unity, strength, and solidarity can be. We must stop making the same mistakes.
References
1 “Biden to Send Missile System to Ukraine in U-Turn – and Issues Nuclear Warning to Russia,” Sky News, June 1, 2022; Guy Chazan, Henry Foy, and Max Seddon, “Germany Makes U-Turn on Sending Heavy Weaponry to Ukraine,” Financial Times, April 26, 2022; Aamer Madhani and Lolita C. Baldor, “Biden’s Shift on F-16s for Ukraine Came after Months of Internal Debate,” Associated Press, August 25, 2023.
2 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Longer-Term Impact of the Ukraine Conflict and the Growing Importance of the Civil Side of War (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2022).
3 Andy Bounds, “EU Scales Back China Investment Screening Plans to Avoid ‘Turf War,’” Financial Times, January 24, 2024.
4 Elisabeth Braw, “How Globalization Rose and Fell with Nord Stream,” Foreign Policy, April 29, 2024.
5 Stuart Lau, “Taiwan Eyes Fresh Trade Pact with EU,” Politico, January 17, 2024.
6 David Sacks and Seaton Huang, Onshoring Semiconductor Production: National Security versus Economic Efficiency (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2024).
7 Mike Cherney, “China Sours on Australian Wine as Trade Spat Spirals,” Wall Street Journal, August 18, 2020; Vanessa Friedman and Elizabeth Paton, “What Is Going on with China, Cotton, and All of These Clothing Brands?,” New York Times, March 29, 2021.
8 “Ukraine Support Tracker – A Database of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine,” IFW Kiel, June 6, 2024.
9 “Macron Criticized for Saying Europe Should Take Independent Stance on Taiwan,” Reuters, April 10, 2023.
10 Tomas Janeliunas, Lithuania’s Presidential Elections: Impact on Relations with Taiwan and China (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, 2024).
11 “Macron Criticised for Saying Europe Should Take Independent Stance on Taiwan,” Reuters, April 10, 2023.
12 “China Continues ‘Combat Training’ Around Taiwan After Drills End,” Reuters, April 11, 2023.