In 1947, as Europe was recovering from the devastation of war, the Greek government faced off against a communist insurgency. Struggling to resist the pressure of the Soviet-supported rebellion and crippled by a crumbling economy, the leaders of Greece looked to the United States for help, an appeal the Truman administration accommodated.
The moment marked the beginning of a new era in U.S. foreign policy in which the United States has consistently used its power and resources to address various crises. This ability to effectively resolve geopolitical emergencies has in turn shaped American power and prestige. The United States’ triumph in the Cold War, its victory over Iraq in the first Gulf War, and its handling of the 2008 financial meltdown have all contributed to Washington’s dominant position on the global stage.
Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright even referred to her country as the “indispensable nation.”1 From this perspective, the United States is the guardian of international order, often depicted in popular culture as the world’s policeman, sheriff, or firefighter. Even if these expressions of popular culture would be a caricature of Americans and the power of their nation, they reflect a core belief that the United States plays a vital role in advancing human civilization. This belief is rooted in a Whig interpretation of history,2 asserting that the world will progressively become more free, prosperous, and peaceful. And if the forces of free markets and liberal democracy were to falter, the United States would step in to intervene.
The German historian Reinhart Koselleck dedicated his lifetime to chronicling the significance of political concepts. One such concept he explored was crisis, tracing its origins back to ancient Greece. In Greek, the word krino carried a dual meaning of “divorce” or “quarrel,” as well as “decision.” For instance, when Thucydides wrote about the Persian War and mentioned that “the decision was reached quickly as a result of two naval battles and two battles on land,”3 he used the term krino. Koselleck argues that crisis remained a Kampfbegriff—a battle cry—a concept that mobilized action by “imposing choices between stark alternatives, such as right or wrong, salvation or damnation, life or death.”4
Identifying a problem as a crisis thus draws upon a long tradition in Western political thought. The Whig interpretation of American power, as a guardrail against divergence in the course of history, aligns well with the definition of crisis as a fundamental Western political concept. In this view, history is made when societies verge off the highway of progress. At this point of crisis, someone must stand ready to get history back on track. A significant aspect of American power lies in this role as the guardian at the gate.
When Joe Biden became president in 2021, he was eager to reassert the United States’ status as the keeper of global affairs after the isolationist tendencies of the Donald Trump administration. However, the role of watchman becomes increasingly complex as American hegemony is contested externally and internally. The differences in positions between the Western powers with regards to war in Gaza is one area where the Biden administration has had difficulties in holding together a “crisis coalition.” Similarly, the United States’ ability to act as the leader in the expanding conflict with Russia has been challenged by the way in which continued support for Ukraine has become the victim of domestic politics.
The Biden Administration’s Engagement Approach
These internal dynamics have highlighted the vulnerability of U.S. allies to American disengagement as partners around the world now have heightened concerns that the United States may not form crisis coalitions or effectively manage any number of urgent situations. This is not due to a lack of capability on the part of the United States—the Biden administration’s initial response to the war in Ukraine demonstrated how effectively it could handle this emerging European security crisis—rather it is due to the political struggle between Republicans and Democrats in Washington, which now seems to take precedence over addressing global crises.
This was evident during the pandemic and again when aid to Ukraine was halted due to political strife in Congress surrounding the budget. British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak pointedly remarked, “to our allies, if we give President Zelensky the tools, the Ukrainians will finish the job.”5 Sunak appeared uncertain about whether the United States would follow through, leaving Europeans to support Ukraine on their own. This poses a risk to the United States’ global influence, as this sort of crisis management has historically been a crucial role for the U.S. government. While allies may seek assistance from other sources, there is inherent value in being part of a coalition with the United States.
Thus, the belief in American power as the guardian of history has a flip side. When the United States fails to resolve or even exacerbates a crisis, it immediately instils fear of a global order collapse or the impending decline of American power. The retreat from Vietnam eroded faith in America, and only with the end of the Cold War did the United States fully recover its global standing.
The utilization of flawed intelligence in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq not only undermined the credibility of American intelligence agencies, but also cast doubt on the stated intentions of the U.S. government. It was only through the adept utilization of intelligence reports by the Biden administration, which exposed Russian troop movements before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, that some of the lost credibility was restored. In each instance, the U.S. government’s handling of a crisis shaped its capacity to respond to subsequent crises.
It was of course not a mere coincidence that the Biden administration made deliberate efforts to restore trust in U.S. intelligence and confidence in American decision-making during times of crisis. In the era of the Trump administration, fears had escalated among allies that the United States was no longer a reliable crisis manager, but rather a potential source of instability. In his inaugural address, President Joe Biden said, “we will repair our alliances and engage with the world once again.”6
Reestablishing American credibility as a crisis manager has been an important foreign policy goal for the Biden administration from the beginning. And while the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan left allies feeling increasingly uncertain about the U.S. government’s crisis management capabilities, the initial response to the Ukraine war helped assuage these concerns.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University on September 13, 2023, reaffirmed the United States’ traditional approach of rallying allies in times of crisis. “We start with the problem that we need to solve and we work back from there, assembling the group of partners that’s the right size and the right shape to address it,” Blinken said. “We’re intentional about determining the combination that’s truly fit for purpose.”7 He emphasized the principle of starting with the problem, or crisis, at hand and then assembling a suitable coalition of partners, taking into account their size and capabilities. He acknowledged the importance of collaborating not only with fellow democracies, but also with autocratic governments, recognizing that democracies may not always reach consensus.
This concept of “diplomatic variable geometry,” as described by Blinken, bears resemblance to the world in which President Truman operated. It is a rejection of the Trumpian view that diplomacy is “the art of the deal,” rather than problem-solving. While Secretary Blinken dismisses the Trump worldview that the United States hardly has any allies in the true sense of the word, he accepts that the United States must focus on dealing with individual problems rather than engaging in grand schemes. President George W. Bush referred to this same concept in 2005 when he said the United States had an “ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”8 By emphasizing the need for the United States to engage with international institutions, Blinken conveyed the message of restraint and adaptability in navigating a complex global landscape.
Blinken’s emphasis on flexibility in forming coalitions underscores the importance of identifying the problems these coalitions aim to solve. In this regard, the Biden administration’s approach to coalition-building exemplifies the enduring power and effectiveness of American leadership in times of crisis.
The process of building a crisis coalition unfolds as follows: First, the problem at hand must be clearly defined, as Blinken suggests, because it serves as the foundation upon which the coalition is built. Second, the United States works to establish a consensus among its allies regarding the necessity of addressing the problem and the most suitable means of doing so. Third, the identification of the problem and the mobilization of allies culminate in a call for action—a recognition that something must be done. Subsequently, concerted action is taken, and the fourth priority becomes to effectively manage the crisis coalition until the mission is accomplished. Lastly, the U.S. government engages its allies in post-crisis management, ensuring a comprehensive and collaborative approach to long-term stability.
Through this strategic framework, the United States has leveraged its leadership to effectively address global crises, demonstrating the strength and influence of the American way of managing international politics.
American Power Shapes the Global Crisis Discourse
In foreign policy debates among U.S. allies, those advocating for the need to confront Russia or China often refer to discussions in Washington. The United States’ ability to shape the discourse on what constitutes a crisis not only gives Washington global influence, but also places a tremendous responsibility on the quality of the American debate. When American foreign policy discourse fails to convince even a sympathetic allied audience, the United States loses some of its mobilizing power. One example is how the United States’ identification of Vietnam as a crisis worth fighting for caused a significant rift with Europeans, who were not convinced that it was the most effective approach to fighting the Cold War. In 1965, Henry Kissinger recalled that German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told him that “the war in Vietnam was a disaster. Europe was the decisive area, and [the United States was] instead getting sucked deeper into the morass in Southeast Asia.”9 Similarly, the 2003 Iraq war eroded confidence in the judgment of U.S. presidents among a generation of Europeans.
In the cases of Vietnam and Iraq, the United States failed to build a consensus among its allies. Instead of being restrained by the skeptical majority, U.S. leadership chose to fight with a coalition of what the Bush administration referred to as the “willing and able.”10 While this approach is often criticized as “unilateralism” by allies, it demonstrates the United States’ ability to act independently. This realization has led allies to fear American disengagement as much, if not more, than the perception of engaging in foolish wars.
The Biden administration’s approach to the war in Ukraine strategically utilizes the concepts of engagement and disengagement. By making clear their commitment to supporting Ukraine and refusing to let the conflict escalate into a wider war, President Biden has effectively framed the Ukraine crisis in a way that compelled skeptical allies such as Germany to participate in the coalition to support Ukraine. Germany’s biggest fear, the escalation of the conflict, was addressed, while the strong U.S. commitment to supporting the government in Kyiv ensured that Washington could define the Western strategy.
An important aspect of any strategy is determining the cost of victory or defeat. In the case of the Ukraine war, the Biden administration defined the conflict as a crisis of historical significance. Speaking in Warsaw one year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the President said “the world, in my view, is at an inflection point. The decisions we make over the next five years or so are going to determine and shape our lives for decades to come.”11
An inflection point is a good definition of krino, and the president uses this notion as a rallying cry in the best tradition of the Western concept of crisis. Furthermore, the administration has framed the conflicts with China and Russia as a way for the United States to lead the next industrial revolution. “We need the United States, and we need its partners to remain the world’s innovative leaders and standard setters to ensure that universal rights and democratic values remain at the center of all the innovation that’s to come, and that it delivers real benefits in people’s lives,” Secretary Blinken has noted.12
The competition with China is framed as an innovation crisis—yet another inflection point—where the democracies risk losing ground to especially Chinese innovations. Whereas the Trump administration to a large extent also recognized this crisis, it regarded the Western allies as competitors rather than allies in a struggle against China. The Biden administration has taken a more traditional approach to forming a crisis coalition. This has already prompted mobilization in the private sector, making it logical for the Biden administration and other Western governments to seek cooperation from both corporations and governments. Boycotting Russia has become a matter of corporate social responsibility in light of the crisis. Moreover, by leveraging the power of corporations and mobilizing the private sector, the United States and its allies have been able to supplement the crisis coalition of governments with a coalition of industry.
In Ukraine, the United States successfully assembled a crisis coalition in a textbook manner, mainly consisting of European nations. However, this was not the case during the pandemic. The pandemic itself presented a classic example of an international crisis where the United States was expected to mobilize a coalition to manage it. It seemed natural that a global response would be warranted, as depicted in pre-pandemic movies like Contagion, Outbreak, or World War Z, where the United States, either alone or through the United Nations, leads a global medical emergency.
In real life, such a crisis coalition never materialized. Instead, individual governments dealt with the pandemic by implementing closed borders. This perception of Western countries shutting themselves off to the world and prioritizing vaccine development for their own citizens has created widespread disillusionment in the Global South, as noted by former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband in Foreign Affairs.13 The absence of a crisis coalition during the pandemic has made mobilizing one in favor of Ukraine exceedingly challenging in these less prosperous non-Western nations. In contrast, by positioning themselves as an alternative to Western hypocrisy, Russia and China have been able to garner allies, particularly in Africa.
A crisis is often presented as an opportunity for action. Rahm Emanuel, President Barack Obama’s Chief of Staff, reminded us during the financial crisis in 2008 with the grandiosity of someone overseeing a trillion-dollar investment program that “you never want a serious crisis to go to waste.” Emanuel echoed Paul Romer, a Stanford economist, who reportedly told a group of venture capitalists in California that “a crisis is a terrible thing to waste.”14 The pandemic is a prime example of a wasted crisis, and it highlights the real consequences for American power and Western prestige when crisis coalitions fail to form and address global crises.
The Strength of Coalitions Beats the Game of National Interests
The ongoing cultural divide, as manifested in profound political disagreements over America’s role in the world, has hindered its ability to form a crisis coalition and manage the pandemic effectively. Because crisis management has long been a crucial role for the U.S. government, this poses a risk to the nation’s global influence. By working together with the United States, allies gain access and influence in Washington. When British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously told President Bush Senior that it was “no time to go wobbly” after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990,15 she was exercising the kind of influence one gets by being part of a team tasked with addressing a specific problem.
Without coalition efforts, diplomacy can devolve into a game of national interests rather than collaborative problem-solving. The “special relationship” between the U.K. and the United States, as well as smaller allies’ efforts to contribute to specific issues, are ways to enhance Washington’s decision-making process and define paths for allies to seek influence. Without crisis coalitions, the pathways to American power become fewer and less meaningful. Smaller powers will then go elsewhere to form crisis coalitions.
Dealing with a crisis coalition is one challenge, but ensuring its stability for post-crisis management is another issue altogether. The Western coalition is facing increasing difficulties in supporting and supplying the Kyiv government during the war, and questions have arisen about what Ukraine will require after the conflict ends. The country’s conditions for accepting a peace settlement may largely depend on whether Kyiv is offered EU and NATO membership.
A crisis holds political power because it pertains to the future. It is used to describe inflection points that require immediate action, shaping the government’s response and planning for future crises. Our expectations of what constitutes a crisis and its purpose already shape the crises of the future. American power has been attractive for its representation of those who seek a better future and safeguard liberal market economies. However, this appeal diminishes when allies are uncertain of the United States’ support during international crises, and it can become a liability when domestic turmoil dominates U.S. foreign policy.
References
1 Madeleine Albright, “Interview on NBC-TV ‘The Today Show’ with Matt Lauer Columbus, Ohio.” U.S. Department of State, February 19, 1998.
2 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1965).
3 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. (London: Penguin, 1972): 1.23.
4 Reinhart Koselleck, “Crisis.” Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no. 2, April 2006: 358.
5 Rishi Sunak, “Speech at Conservative Party Conference.” The Spectator, October 4, 2023.
6 Joe Biden, “Inaugural Address by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.” The White House, January 20, 2021.
7 Antony Blinken, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken Remarks to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) ‘The Power and Purpose of American Diplomacy in a New Era.’” U.S. Department of State, September 13, 2023.
8 George W. Bush, “President Bush’s Second Inaugural Address.” NPR, January 20, 2005.
9 Quoted in Niall Ferguson, Kissinger. 1923-1968: The Idealist. (London: Penguin Books, 2016): 712-13.
10 George W. Bush, “President Bush Welcomes Seven Nations to the NATO Alliance: Remarks by the President on the Enlargement of NATO.” The White House, March 29, 2004.
11 Joe Biden, “Remarks by President Biden Ahead of the One-Year Anniversary of Russia’s Brutal and Unprovoked Invasion of Ukraine.” The White House, February 21, 2023.
12 Antony Blinken, “Secretary Blinken’s Remarks at the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s (NSCAI) Global Emerging Technology Summit, in Washington, D.C.” U.S. Department of State, July 13, 2021.
13 David Miliband, “The World Beyond Ukraine: The Survival of the West and the Demands of the Rest.” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2023.
14 Jack Rosenthal, “A Terrible Thing to Waste.” New York Times Magazine, July 31, 2009.
15 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years. (London: HarperCollins, 2012): 823-24.